Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 82 | Issue 4

Article 5

1-1-2017

“Lucky” Adnan Syed: Comprehensive Changes to
Improve Criminal Defense Lawyering and Better
Protect Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights
Meredith J. Duncan

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Meredith J. Duncan, “Lucky” Adnan Syed: Comprehensive Changes to Improve Criminal Defense Lawyering and Better Protect Defendants’
Sixth Amendment Rights, 82 Brook. L. Rev. (2017).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol82/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

“Lucky” Adnan Syed
COMPREHENSIVE CHANGES TO IMPROVE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERING AND BETTER
PROTECT DEFENDANTS’ SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
Meredith J. Duncan†
INTRODUCTION
Almost twenty years ago, seventeen years old and
accused of murder, Adnan Syed was deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at trial and
sentenced to life in prison as a result.1 Fortunately, Syed has
recently secured post-conviction relief.2 Although he has had to
wait almost two decades—and as of this writing, remains in
prison awaiting a new trial—the social media and public
attention to his situation have made Adnan Syed a lucky man.
The reality is that Syed is just another casualty of the criminal
justice system’s tolerance of poor defense lawyering.3 The
substandard quality of legal representation highlighted in Syed’s
case continues to harm countless defendants nationwide, and
the promise of effective assistance of counsel for the accused
remains unfulfilled due to a combination of factors. This article
suggests comprehensive changes to certain aspects of the
criminal justice system in an effort to improve the overall
quality of criminal defense lawyering.
† George Butler Research Professor of Law and Director, Metropolitan
Programs, University of Houston Law Center. Thanks to the University of Houston Law
Center and the University of Houston Law Foundation for generously supporting this
project. Special thanks to David R. Dow, Marcilynn Burke, Gerry Moohr, and Sandy
Guerra Thompson for reading earlier drafts of this article; Mon Yin Lung, Christopher
Dykes, Emily Lawson, Daniel Donahue, Katy Badeaux, and Robert Clark for their
wonderful library assistance; and Victor Zertuche for research assistance.
1 Memorandum Opinion II at 56–58, Syed v. State, No. 199103042−046 (Md.
Cir. Ct. June 30, 2016).
2 Id.
3 See Jessica Anderson, Judge Denies ‘Serial’ Subject Adnan Syed’s Release
on Bail, BALT. SUN (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/
crime/bs-md-ci-syed-bail-denied-20161229-story.html [https://perma.cc/SF3S-2TFU].
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In the more than thirty years since the definitive
ineffective assistance of counsel case Strickland v. Washington,4
prisoners have famously had difficulty proving that their trial
counsel provided constitutionally inadequate representation.5
The success rate of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is
well documented as abysmally low.6 Worse still, the failure rate
of ineffective assistance claims does not accurately reflect the
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see Stephen F. Smith, Taking
Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 518 (2009) (describing Strickland as
providing the “governing standard” in ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
5 One of the most notorious debates regarding whether a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights pursuant to Strickland had been violated took place in Burdine v.
Johnson, also known as the “sleeping lawyer case.” Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336
(5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); see Diane Jennings & Ed Timms, Court Sides with Inmate in
Sleeping-Lawyer Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 14, 2001, at 1A (referring to
Burdine as “Sleeping-Lawyer Case”). Calvin Burdine was accused of killing a man
during a robbery in Texas. Burdine, 262 F.3d at 338–39. Joe Cannon, an experienced
criminal defense attorney, was appointed to represent Burdine against capital murder
charges. Id. at 339. At trial, Burdine’s lawyer slept through “substantial periods” of the
trial. See id. at 339–40. Not surprisingly, Burdine was convicted and sentenced to
death. Id. at 339. After his direct appeal was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, Burdine sought collateral relief from the state courts based on his lawyer’s
poor representation. Id. at 339–40. The Texas lower court concluded that Burdine had
in fact received ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 340 (stating that the habeas
court found that “[b]ased on evidence that ‘defense counsel repeatedly dozed and/or
actually slept during substantial portions of [Burdine’s] capital murder trial so that
defense counsel was, in effect, absent[,]’ the habeas court concluded that a showing of
prejudice in accordance with Strickland v. Washington was not required. . . . [T]he
court recommended that habeas relief be granted.” Id. (alterations in original) (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted)). However, on appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, the highest court in Texas that reviews criminal cases, the court reversed the
grant of habeas. Id. In a one-page opinion, the court ruled that even though Burdine’s
claim that his lawyer slept through portions of his trial were supported by the record,
Burdine still failed to establish an ineffectiveness claim pursuant to Strickland. Id.
Burdine then appealed to the federal courts for habeas relief. Id. A panel of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of relief. Id. at 338. It was not until
the Fifth Circuit reheard the case sitting en banc that a sharply divided court ruled
that Burdine’s sleeping lawyer amounted to constitutionally inadequate representation
under Strickland. Id. at 349–50. Arguing that there was no evidence that a sleeping
person was in fact an unconscious person, id. at 362 n.2, the dissenting judges
explained that under the circumstances, a showing of prejudice should be required. Id.
at 364. The most striking and disturbing aspect of Burdine’s sixteen-year travail
through the state and federal court systems is that ostensibly reasonable minds,
applying Strickland, sharply differed regarding whether a lawyer, who was proved to
have slept through “substantial periods” of his client’s trial, provided ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 340. The ability to differ intellectually considering such
egregious circumstances does not speak well for the means by which our justice system
measures constitutionally acceptable legal representation. See Ira Mickenberg, Drunk,
Sleeping, and Incompetent Lawyers: Is It Possible to Keep Innocent People off Death
Row?, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 319 (2004).
6 See generally Victor E. Flango & Patricia McKenna, Federal Habeas
Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 237, 259 (1995)
(explaining that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are granted at a rate of less
than 1% in federal courts and less than 10% in state courts); Nancy J. King, Essay,
Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2431 (2013)
(describing the “notoriously low rate of relief in federal habeas [claims]. . . . [as] less
than 1% of noncapital habeas petitions”).
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frequency with which defendants receive unacceptable legal
representation at trial. Yet despite well-reasoned criticism,7 a
majority of the Supreme Court has thus far failed to recognize
the insufficiency of current ineffective assistance jurisprudence.
In addition to the Court’s ruling in Strickland, the poor quality
of appointed counsel can be attributed to a combination of
factors including the enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996,8 grossly
underfunded public defender systems in the states, prosecutorial
resistance to pretrial discovery and disclosure requirements, and
the failure of jurists to report instances of incompetent
lawyering in their courtrooms.
Not all poorly represented or wrongfully convicted
prisoners can be as “lucky” as Adnan Syed—but luck should
not be a factor in fulfilling the promise of effective assistance
for the criminally accused. This article suggests changes to
several sectors of the criminal justice system to bolster the
provision of quality defense lawyering and protect defendants’
Sixth Amendment rights.9 Part I underscores the unique
juncture between the criminal justice system and the strong
public interest in Syed’s case created by the media. Part II
explains how the Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington
has contributed to the pervasive problem of inadequate
representation of criminal defendants nationwide. Part III
discusses the difficulty of obtaining a federal writ of habeas
corpus as a result of AEDPA—thus making it all the more
problematic for prisoners to secure post-conviction relief based
on ineffective assistance of counsel. Part IV explores recent
ineffective assistance decisions and considers changing societal
attitudes toward wrongful convictions and what that might
signal about ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.
Part V proposes comprehensive reforms to the criminal justice
system, all geared toward improving the quality of criminal
defense lawyering and providing more protection for criminal
defendants’ right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Suggested reforms include: (a) modifying Strickland;10 (b)
7 See, e.g., Larry Yackle, AEDPA Mea Culpa, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 330, 330
(2012) (describing habeas litigation as a nightmare which delivers “unjust and bizarre
results” and squanders limited resources).
8 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
9 In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10 See discussion infra Section V.A.
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revising AEDPA;11 (c) encouraging jurists to report lawyer
misconduct in their courtrooms;12 (d) adopting open-file systems
in all prosecutors’ offices;13 and (e) increasing the funding of
public defender offices.14 Adoption of any one of the proposed
reforms will result in better criminal defense lawyering and
significant advancement toward the protection of criminal
defendants’ constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel. Implemented as a whole, these suggestions will result
in a vast improvement in criminal defense lawyering overall
and more meaningful protection of criminal defendants’ Sixth
Amendment rights, hopefully eliminating the need for
defendants to be lucky.
I.

“LUCKY” ADNAN SYED’S USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA YIELDS
REMARKABLE RESULTS

In January 1999, seventeen-year-old Hae Min Lee
disappeared after attending class at her high school in Baltimore
County, Maryland. Her body, which had been strangled to death
and partially covered in a makeshift grave, was discovered a few
weeks later.15 Shortly after the discovery and relying on an
anonymous tip, the authorities focused their investigation
almost exclusively on Adnan Syed.16 At the time, Syed, also
seventeen years old, and Lee were classmates.17 They had
previously dated and were friends at the time of her killing.18
After an initial mistrial, Syed’s second trial began in
January 2000 and lasted for almost two months.19 At trial,
Syed was represented by Christina Gutierrez—an experienced
criminal defense attorney who, after working at Baltimore’s
public defender’s office, privately practiced in the Baltimore
area for well over twenty years.20 Gutierrez came highly
recommended to the Syed family.21 Unfortunately for Syed,
Gutierrez’s ability to represent her clients adequately
deteriorated drastically over the years, as she was suffering
from multiple sclerosis, had encountered serious financial
See discussion infra Section V.B.
See discussion infra Section V.C.
13 See discussion infra Section V.D.
14 See discussion infra Section V.E.
15 See RABIA CHAUDRY, ADNAN’S STORY: THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH AND JUSTICE
AFTER SERIAL 44–47 (2016); see also Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 3.
16 See CHAUDRY, supra note 15, at 55.
17 See id. at 2, 50–51.
18 See id.
19 See id. at 2, 149.
20 See id. at 105–06.
21 See id. at 103.
11

12
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troubles, and was struggling to handle her very busy docket—all
of which contributed to an inability to represent them
competently.22 Gutierrez’s defense theory was so incoherent that,
at times, it was unclear whether she actually had a clear
understanding of the theory of defense she was presenting to
the jury.23
A myriad of errors occurred at Syed’s trial, some of
which were patent, others not so easily detected, even by those
present at his trial. Nonetheless, errors permeated the entire
trial process. For example, before Syed’s trial, Gutierrez made
several critical mistakes, not the least of which was failing to
contact and investigate an alibi witness—Asia McClain—who
would have established that she was with Syed during the
window of time in which Lee was allegedly killed.24
Importantly, Gutierrez botched the cross-examination of one of
the State’s key witnesses, cell phone record expert Abraham
Waranowitz, whose testimony was presented to establish
Syed’s whereabouts at the time of the crime.25 The cell tower
22 The combination of her problems ultimately led to her disbarment. Sarah
Koenig, Lawyer Gutierrez Agrees to Disbarment, BALT. SUN (June 2, 2001),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2001-06-02/news/0106020237_1_lawyer-gutierrez-clients
[https://perma.cc/3PZB-U58Z]. In May 2001, faced with multiple grievances filed against
her with the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission, Gutierrez agreed to her own
disbarment. Id. Shortly after her disbarment (and only a year and a half after
representing Syed at trial), Gutierrez said that she was blind in one eye, could barely
walk, and had been hospitalized for most of the winter. Id. In addition to her
deteriorating health, Gutierrez had mishandled and misappropriated client funds, and
dozens of clients claimed that they had paid Attorney Gutierrez but that Gutierrez
failed to file their pleadings. Id. After another practicing lawyer reported her to the
Commission, she consented to her disbarment. Id.; see also CHAUDRY, supra note 15, at
198–99, 201, 229, 369 (discussing Gutierrez’s deteriorating health and ultimate
disbarment); Justin George, Son of ‘Serial’ Subject’s Lawyer Defends Mother, BALT.
SUN (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-serialsyed-lawyer-20150408-story.html [http://perma.cc/342B-UDGV].
23 See CHAUDRY, supra note 15, at 157–69 (describing Gutierrez’s defense of
Syed throughout his second trial as “confused,” “rambling,” and “barely coherent”); id.
at 156 (quoting Gutierrez’s trial argument). Gutierrez also questioned witnesses in a
bizarre fashion and made confusing arguments before the jury and judge. Episode 14—
Tina, UNDISCLOSED (Nov. 2, 2015) (downloaded using iTunes) (containing audio
recording of Gutierrez’s disjointed trial argument).
24 See Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 12. In its opinion, the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City explained that the State’s evidence presented at trial
established that Lee was killed between 2:35 p.m. and 2:40 p.m. on January 13, 1999,
at a Best Buy parking lot. Id. at 11–12. McClain would have testified that she was with
Syed in the library, located several miles from Best Buy, on that date between 2:20
p.m. and 2:40 p.m. Id.
25 Id. at 38–40. The State presented cell tower location evidence from which
the jury was to infer the precise location of Syed during the alleged burial of Lee’s body.
Id. at 38–39. The exhibit containing the cell phone information that the State presented
at trial was an excerpt of a complete set of cell phone tower information, which the
State supplied to Syed’s attorney during pretrial discovery months before the trial. Id. at
40. The coversheet from the phone company, which accompanied the records, explained
how the records were to be interpreted and included a disclaimer providing that incoming
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evidence was unreliable, however, and should not have been
used to determine a person’s—more specifically, Syed’s—
precise location.26 Nonetheless, Gutierrez failed to question the
witness about the use and reliability of cell tower evidence in
determining Syed’s location.27
In addition to Gutierrez’s mistakes, the prosecution
engaged in questionable conduct both before and during
Syed’s trial.28 Prior to trial, the prosecution failed to turn over
discoverable information, even after multiple requests by
Gutierrez.29 For example, the defense repeatedly sought
information about the anticipated testimony of one of the
State’s key witnesses, Jay Wilds.30 The defense also requested
the results of Lee’s autopsy, a request which was not honored.31
The autopsy report described the pattern of lividity on Lee’s
body, a pattern that was in opposition to the prosecution’s theory
of the case.32 In addition to the prosecution’s reluctance to
produce the requested material, at trial the prosecution also
made missteps (to put it graciously) in apparently failing to
detect the dishonesty of its witnesses, including police officers
who initially and repeatedly interviewed Wilds.33 All of this
calls could not be used as reliable information of a cell phone’s location. See id. However,
the prosecution used the information about incoming phone calls listed on the cell tower
logs to prove Syed’s location during the alleged crime, in direct contradiction of the
disclaimer. See id. at 42–43. Gutierrez failed to cross-examine the State’s expert about
the disclaimer. See id. at 43; see also CHAUDRY, supra note 15, at 338.
26 There is substantial literature on the inappropriate use of cell phone tower
triangulation to determine a cell phone caller’s location. See, e.g., Tom Jackman, Experts
Say Law Enforcement’s Use of Cellphone Records Can Be Inaccurate, WASH. POST (June
27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/experts-say-law-enforcements-use-ofcellphone-records-can-be-inaccurate/2014/06/27/028be93c-faf3-11e3-932c-0a55b81f48ce_
story.html (explaining severe limitations on use of cell tower information to determine a
person’s whereabouts); Michael Cherry et al., Cell Tower Junk Science, 95 JUDICATURE
151, 151 (2012) (explaining that cell tower evidence cannot reliably determine a person’s
location).
27 See Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 46 (in which the court ruled
that Gutierrez had failed to cross-examine cell phone expert properly in light of cell
phone record coversheet).
28 See CHAUDRY, supra note 15, at 318 (explaining that “the prosecution
clearly did everything in its power to thwart discovery and withhold as much
information as possible” from Syed’s attorney).
29 Id. at 131 (explaining Gutierrez had to make multiple demands to compel
full discovery on details of Syed’s case).
30 Id. at 319. Jay Wilds ultimately testified that Syed showed him Lee’s body
immediately after she was killed and that Wilds was with Syed when Syed buried her
body in a local park. Id. at 144.
31 See id. at 131, 318.
32 Id. at 305. Lividity is settling of blood in a body post mortem. Id. at 304. In
a deceased body, gravity pulls blood to portions of the body closest to the ground
causing a purplish discoloration where the blood and tissues have settled. Id.
33 Undisclosed revealed that Wilds was likely coached into testifying falsely by
the police officers who were later witnesses at Syed’s trial. See id. at 328–29; see also
Cristina Everett, 5 Key Findings from Undisclosed that Serial Missed, ENTM’T WEEKLY
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conduct, combined with the prosecution’s misguided reliance on
the cell tower evidence—in contradiction with the cell tower
evidence’s evidentiary value—proved problematic.34
The culmination of mistakes by Syed’s attorney as well as
questionable prosecutorial conduct resulted in the conviction of
Adnan Syed for the kidnapping, robbery, and murder of Hae Min
Lee. Post-conviction, Syed fired Gutierrez, and a public defender
represented him at sentencing,35 where he was sentenced to life in
prison plus thirty years.36 Since his conviction, Syed has received
legal assistance from various attorneys who have repeatedly
argued that the case was plagued with defense counsel errors
amounting to constitutional violations and prosecutorial missteps,
including multiple Brady violations.37 Nonetheless, for almost
twenty years, Syed’s requests for relief were denied.
Then came the social media frenzy. It started when the
creators of the podcast Serial decided to focus on Syed’s story in
the show’s inaugural season. In October 2014, Serial released
its first episode, and the podcast series quickly became wildly
popular, receiving several awards.38 Public interest in Syed’s
case exploded.39 Serial was so popular that it spawned other
podcasts that focused initially on Syed’s case as well, the most
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://ew.com/article/2015/08/24/5-key-finding-undisclosed-serial-adnansyed/ [https://perma.cc/C6WV-HLQV].
34 See supra notes 25–27 (describing that the cell tower evidence indicated
that it was unreliable to use to determine a caller’s location).
35 See CHAUDRY, supra note 15, at 179–80.
36 See id. at 183.
37 In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Court ruled that the
constitution requires prosecuting authorities to disclose to the defense all material,
exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession, id. at 87. Failure of the prosecutor
to do so is commonly referred to as a “Brady violation.” In Syed’s case, the State was
accused of “suppress[ing] favorable and material evidence of an oral side agreement
with the State’s key witness,” as well as “introducing false and misleading evidence.”
See Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 1, 8–10.
38 Serial investigative reporter Sarah Koenig was named one of Time
Magazine’s 100 Most Influential People in 2015. See Ewan McGregor, Sarah Koenig:
The Investigator in Your Ear, TIME (Apr. 16, 2015), http://time.com/3823276/sarahkoenig-2015-time-100/ [https://perma.cc/LMB3-SFTQ]. Serial was awarded the
Peabody Award in 2014. See Serial, PEABODY AWARDS, http://www.peabodyawards.com/
award-profile/serial [https://perma.cc/4YMM-EM4A]; Richard Gorelick, ‘Serial’ Is
First-Ever Podcast to Win Peabody Award; Creator Sarah Koenig Makes Time’s 100
Most Influential People List, BALT. SUN (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
features/baltimore-insider-blog/bal-serial-peabody-podcasts-20150420-story.html
[http://perma.cc/6VAL-WV8R].
39 By the end of its first season, Serial had been downloaded more than 80 million
times, making it the most popular podcast series to date. Monica Hesse, ‘Serial’ takes the
stand: How a podcast became a character in its own narrative, WASH. POST (Feb. 8 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/when-a-post-conviction-hearing-feels-like-a-seq
uel-the-weirdness-of-serial-back-on-the-stand/2016/02/08/b3782c60-2a49-48f7-9480-a34d
d9e07ab6_story.html?utm_term=.d204186ba68d
[https://perma.cc/Y4YV-W9UW];
see
Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 58 (describing “phenomenally strong public
interest [in Syed’s case] created by modern media”).
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popular of which was Undisclosed.40 Countless articles and
news reports regarding Syed’s situation and the death of Hae
Min Lee followed,41 and the spotlight on the conviction of
Adnan Syed shone brightly.42
One of the podcasts about Syed’s case, Undisclosed, was
co-hosted by three lawyers.43 Through meticulous examination
of the record, one co-host—Susan Simpson—realized that the
cell tower evidence introduced at Syed’s trial was erroneously
used to determine Syed’s location at the time of Lee’s death.44
Simpson’s occasion to scour the record in Syed’s case
meticulously was largely a result of society’s insatiable interest
in Syed’s situation.45 Presented with new information regarding
potential alibi witness Asia McClain as well as the newly
discovered knowledge about the cell tower location evidence,
Syed’s appellate attorney, Justin Brown, fought and successfully
secured a hearing on Syed’s appeal from the trial court’s denial

40 See Erin Whitney, Listen to the First Episode of ‘Undisclosed,’ the New
Adnan
Syed
Podcast,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Apr.
13,
2015),
http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/13/adnan-syed-undisclosed-podcast_n_7057760.html
[https://perma.cc/ZH74-9BS3]. Undisclosed debuted on April 13, 2015. Hosted by two
lawyers and a law professor, Undisclosed promised to give a “smart, nuanced legal
argument based on the totality of the facts in the case.” Id. Undisclosed did not
disappoint, as one of the hosts of Undisclosed uncovered information that would prove to
be critical in the court granting Syed’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. See CHAUDRY,
supra note 15, at 338 (describing Susan Simpson’s discovery of the AT&T fax coversheet
containing disclaimer that cell tower records could not be used to determine location
of calls); Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 40 (finding that Gutierrez
performed deficiently when she failed to cross-examine the cell tower expert properly
regarding the disclaimer in fax coversheet).
41 See CHAUDRY, supra note 15, at 263 (describing the extensive media
coverage, which included outfits such as Time Magazine, MSNBC, Wall Street Journal,
New Yorker, New York Times, Rolling Stone, The Guardian, and Washington Post).
42 Serial and Undisclosed led to somewhat of a revolution not just confined to
social media. For example, Netflix’s Making a Murderer highlighted the questionable
convictions of Steven Avery and Brendan Dassey. See, e.g., Amelia McDonnell-Parry,
‘Making a Murderer’ One Year Later: Everything You Need to Know, ROLLING STONE
(Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/making-a-murderer-oneyear-later-everything-to-know-w455262 [https://perma.cc/RP5D-Y9TZ] (describing how
the show raised questions regarding the validity of the convictions of Avery and
Dassey). Since the broadcast of Making a Murderer, the conviction of Brendan Dassey
has been overturned. See Merritt Kennedy, Judge Overturns Conviction of ‘Making a
Murderer’ Subject Brendan Dassey, NPR (Aug. 13, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2016/08/13/489882661/judge-overturns-conviction-of-making-a-murderer-sub
ject-brendan-dassey [https://perma.cc/9M5L-JRPK].
43 The co-hosts of Undisclosed are Rabia Chaudry, Colin Miller, and Susan
Simpson. See CHAUDRY, supra note 15, at 301–302, 325–28.
44 See id. at 301–02.
45 See id. at 284-288 (explaining Simpson’s detailed investigation into Syed’s
case was prompted by the Serial podcast). Additionally, the Undisclosed podcast has
raised, through crowd-sourcing, thousands of dollars for Syed’s legal defense team. See
#FreeAdnan—the Adnan Syed Trust, LAUNCHGOOD, https://www.launchgood.com/
project/the_adnan_syed_trust [https://perma.cc/4KFN-RUC5].
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of his application for post-conviction relief.46 At the five-daylong February 2016 hearing, Brown argued that Syed received
ineffective assistance of counsel based in part on Gutierrez’s
failure even to contact the critical alibi witness, as well as her
failure to cross-examine properly the State’s expert witness
regarding the cell tower evidence.47 Amazingly—to those
familiar with the rarity of ineffective assistance of counsel claim
successes48—the court granted relief, ruling that Syed “was
entitled to post-conviction relief because trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance when she failed to cross-examine the
State’s expert regarding the unreliability of cell tower location
evidence.”49 Because the State is currently appealing the
decision within the state court system, Syed’s case does not yet
qualify for post-conviction consideration in federal court.50
Luckily, Syed managed to secure the interest of the
American public and, if one believes the court, was coincidentally
able to secure the post-conviction relief he sought for almost two
decades. Without the media’s attention to and society’s interest in
his case, Syed would not have had the resources needed to hire
the high-quality lawyers who successfully secured post-conviction
relief and now work on his behalf. Yet a properly functioning
criminal justice system should detect and resolve such

46 See Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 59 (granting Syed’s petition
for post-conviction relief, vacating Syed’s conviction, and granting a new trial).
47 Id. at 57–58.
48 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 101
& n.173 (2008) (explaining in 2007, after passage of AEDPA, there was only 1 successful
habeas petition in 284, far lower than the 1% success rate pre-AEDPA); see generally
Flango & Mckenna, supra note 6 (detailing high failure rate of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims); see also Smith, supra note 4 (discussing how right to effective
representation means little); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal
Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679
(2007) (explaining how ineffective assistance of counsel claims currently lack meaningful
remedies).
49 See Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 38. The court explained:

This case represents a unique juncture between the criminal justice system
and a phenomenally strong public interest created by modern media.
Throughout the proceedings, the parties made repeated efforts to direct the
Court’s attention to the Serial podcast . . . . Serial has attracted millions of
active listeners worldwide and inspired many, through social media, to
support or advocate against [Syed’s] request for post-conviction relief.
Regardless of the public interest surrounding this case, the Court used its
best efforts to address the merits of [Syed’s] petition for post-conviction relief
like it would in any other case that comes before the Court; unfettered by
sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion.
Id. at 58–59 (footnote omitted).
50 See infra Part III (discussing qualification for federal review pursuant
to AEDPA).
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injustices without the added pressures of social and news
media attention.51 Syed is a “lucky” guy.
II.

STRICKLAND USHERS IN DECADES OF DISREGARD FOR
DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL

To better understand Syed’s situation and in order to
appreciate the negative impact of Strickland on the quality of
criminal defense lawyering, it is important to consider the
Supreme Court’s treatment of the right to counsel in general.
Historically, when the Supreme Court considered the right to
counsel in criminal cases52—and indeed in civil proceedings
involving fundamental rights53—the Court rhapsodized about
the value of counsel.54 The Court’s language soared as it
described the importance of the assistance of counsel. However,
the tenor of the Court in right to counsel cases sharply
contrasted with the language the Court used when determining
whether an attorney had provided the constitutionally required
effective assistance of counsel. Consider the following discussion
of the history of the right to counsel cases and the development
of the Court’s ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.55
A.

Right to Counsel Law

Powell v. Alabama56 was the first case in which the
Court ruled that a state’s mere appointment of counsel was
insufficient to satisfy the due process mandates of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.57 Instead, the Court
held that the Constitution requires the effective assistance of
counsel in the preparation and trial of a capital case.58 Powell
involved several young, impoverished African American men
51 Cf. Joseph L. Hoffman, Innocence and Federal Habeas After AEDPA: Time
for the Supreme Court to Act, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 300, 303 (2012) (observing that
actors outside the court system may be better positioned to investigate prisoner claims
than are courts).
52 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
53 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966).
54 See, e.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities,
not luxuries.”).
55 The following section is not meant to be a comprehensive consideration of
right to counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel law, as such a treatment would be
beyond the scope of this piece.
56 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (ruling appointment of counsel
without “accustomed incidents of consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial”
insufficient).
57 Id. at 50.
58 Id. at 53 (explaining Alabama’s appointment of the entire Alabama bar
amounted to “a denial of effective and substantial aid” of counsel).
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and boys59 accused in Alabama state court of raping two white
women, a state capital offense at the time.60 At arraignment,
the trial judge appointed the entire Alabama state bar to
represent the defendants through trial.61 After each defendant
was convicted and sentenced to death,62 the U.S. Supreme
Court was called upon to decide whether these young men and
boys were constitutionally entitled to a more meaningful
appointment of counsel at their capital murder trials.63 A
divided Court64 ultimately decided that they were.65 After
describing that it had no authority to opine on any possible
error that the state court might have made involving violations
of state statutes or its own constitution,66 the Court explained
that under the federal constitution “the necessity of counsel
was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial
of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”67 The Court clarified the constitutional
59 See generally JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994). All nine of
the defendants accused in the Scottsboro tragedy were teenagers. The two youngest were
thirteen years old at the time they were accused of the crime; the oldest was nineteen. Id.
at 6; see DAN CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969).
60 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 49–50.
61 Id. at 49, 53–54, 56.
62 Id. at 50.
63 The sole issue considered by the Court was whether the defendants “were
denied the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation and
opportunity of preparation for trial.” Id.
64 Justice Butler dissented in an opinion joined by Justice McReynolds,
arguing that there was no showing that the petitioners were denied the right to
counsel. Id. at 73–74 (Butler, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 71 (“[W]e think the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable
time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process.”).
66 Id. at 52 (majority opinion) (“With any error of the state court involving
alleged contravention of the state statutes or Constitution we, of course, have
nothing to do.”).
67 Id. at 71 (emphasis added). The Court further stated:

[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested
or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law;
and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and
trial of the case. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental
postulate, already adverted to, “that there are certain immutable principles of
justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of
the Union may disregard.”
Id. at 71–72 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390 (1898)). Rejecting the
argument that the appointment of counsel would interfere with the efficiency with
which trials could proceed without the presence of defense attorneys, the Court stated:
It is true that great and inexcusable delay in the enforcement of our criminal
law is one of the grave evils of our time. Continuances are frequently granted
for unnecessarily long periods of time, and delays incident to the disposition of
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importance of criminal defendants receiving a fair trial and
that it was impossible to conceive of a fair trial when a criminal
defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.68 The
Court elucidated that properly appointed counsel would have
been “impressed with that individual sense of duty which
should and naturally would accompany the appointment of a
selected member of the bar, specifically named and assigned.”69
Without proper counsel, it was impossible to discern what their
defenses may have been.70 The Court described the right to the
effective assistance of counsel as a fundamental right,71 essential
to any fair trial,72 and a vital component of due process.73 Thus,
effective became part of the assistance of counsel lexicon and
applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Several years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,74 the Court
was called upon to decide whether an indigent defendant in
federal court was constitutionally entitled to the assistance of
counsel.75 Not having the funds to retain counsel, the
defendants in Zerbst were tried, convicted, and sentenced for
violating federal law—all without a lawyer.76 On writ of habeas
motions for new trial and hearings upon appeal have come in many cases to be
a distinct reproach to the administration of justice. The prompt disposition of
criminal cases is to be commended and encouraged. But in reaching that result
a defendant, charged with a serious crime, must not be stripped of his right to
have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense. To do that
is not to proceed promptly in the clam spirit of regulated justice but to go
forward with the haste of the mob.
Id. at 59; cf. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 357 (5th Cir. 2001) (Barksdale, J.,
dissenting).
68 Powell, 287 U.S. at 72 (“[I]t is impossible to conceive of a fair trial where he
is compelled to conduct his cause in court, without the aid of counsel.” (quoting
Hendryx v. State, 29 N.E. 1131, 1132 (Ind. 1892))).
69 Id. at 56–57 (“[T]he circumstance lends emphasis to the conclusion that
during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that
is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when
consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the
defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much
entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.”). The Court even pointed out
that in the instant case, a member of the bar appointed to represent the defendants had
an impermissible conflict of interest: “a leading member of the local bar accepted
employment on the side of the prosecution and actively participated in the trial.” Id.
70 Id. at 58 (“Neither they nor the court could say what a prompt and
thoroughgoing investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt was made to
investigate. No opportunity to do so was given.”).
71 Id. at 67–68.
72 Id. at 70.
73 Id. at 71.
74 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 458–60 (1938).
75 Id. at 459. The defendants in Zerbst were charged with violating federal
law by “possessing and uttering counterfeit money.” Id.
76 Id. at 460.
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corpus, the Court directed that the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution granted indigent criminal defendants
charged in federal courts the assistance of counsel and mandated
that counsel be provided for them.77
The “right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defence, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.”78

Because Zerbst was a federal case, the Court’s decision
was seemingly straightforward—there was little question that
the Sixth Amendment applied in federal court. The more
difficult question would be whether the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of assistance of counsel extended to state criminal
proceedings as well. The Court first confronted the state issue
in 1942, when it decided Betts v. Brady.79 In Betts, the Court
held that, absent special circumstances, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel did not extend to state defendants.80 The
defendant in Betts was a poor farm hand with little education81
who was indicted and tried in a Maryland state court for felony
robbery.82 Unable to afford an attorney, he requested that one
77

Id. at 462–63. The Court explained:

The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the
constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not “still be done.” It
embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before
a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is
presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly,
and necessary to the lawyer—to the untrained layman—may appear intricate,
complex and mysterious.
Id. (footnote omitted).
78 Id. at 463 (omission in original) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–
69 (1932)).
79 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
80 Id. at 471 (“[W]e are unable to say that the concept of due process
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States . . . to furnish counsel in
every such case.”); see Gideon, 372 U.S. at 350–51 (Harlan, J., concurring). In elucidating
upon the decision in Betts v. Brady, Justice Harlan explained:
[T]here have been not a few cases in which special circumstances were found in
little or nothing more than the “complexity” of the legal questions presented,
although those questions were often of only routine difficulty. The Court has
come to recognize, in other words, that the mere existence of a serious criminal
charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the services of
counsel at trial.
Id.
81
82

Betts, 316 U.S. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 456–57 (majority opinion).
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be appointed for him, a request that was denied.83 Betts was
ultimately convicted and sentenced to eight years in state
prison.84 On appeal and relying on Powell and Zerbst, Betts
argued that defendants in state court were entitled to the
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, just as
defendants in federal courts.85 The six-justice majority disagreed
and affirmed the lower court’s decision,86 explaining that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not make
the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states.87 Rather, the
majority held that a criminal defendant in state court was
entitled to the appointment of counsel only where there existed
“certain circumstances” justifying such appointment.88
The Betts dissenters argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment made the Sixth Amendment applicable to the
states and that the denial of counsel to indigent defendants ran
the risk of “subject[ing] innocent men to increased dangers of
conviction merely because of their poverty.”89 Writing for the
dissent, Justice Black explained that “[w]hether a man is
innocent cannot be determined from a trial in which, as here,
denial of counsel has made it impossible to conclude, with any
satisfactory degree of certainty, that the defendant’s case was
83 Id. He requested that counsel be appointed, as he was unable to employ
counsel. Id. After an unsuccessful bid at habeas relief in the state courts, the United
States Supreme Court granted his petition for certiorari.
84 See id. at 457–58.
85 Id. at 464 (“The question we are now to decide is whether due process of
law demands that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a State must
furnish counsel to an indigent defendant.”).
86 See id. at 471–73 (explaining that “appointment of counsel is not a
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial”).
87 See id. (spelling out that the Court is “unable to say that the concept of due
process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States, whatever may
be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such case”). The Court explained:

The Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution applies only to trials in
federal courts. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment
although a denial by a state of rights or privileges specifically embodied in
that and others of the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances,
or in connection with other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a
litigant of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth.
Id. at 461–62 (footnotes omitted).
88 See id. at 462. “[W]e cannot say that the [Fourteenth] amendment
embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be
fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.”
Id. at 473.
89 Id. at 474–76 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black’s dissent was joined by
Justices Douglas and Murphy. Id. at 474. Justice Black would later pen the majority’s
opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, the opinion overruling Betts. See Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336 (1963); see also discussion infra Section II.A.1
(discussing Gideon).
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adequately presented.”90 Relying on Powell v. Alabama, the
dissenters proclaimed the right to counsel as fundamental in
criminal proceedings.91
Fortunately, the majority opinion in Betts proved to be
an aberration.92 After the 1950s, the Court—relying more
heavily on due process—found special circumstances in most
every case. Such rulings were in tension with what came to be
known as Betts’s “special circumstances” test, which denied
counsel in the absence of so-called “special circumstances.”93 For
instance, in the 1961 case Hamilton v. Alabama,94 the Court
concluded that in capital cases, the defendant’s arraignment was
a critical stage of the proceeding, necessitating the presence of
counsel.95 During the same era, the Court held that due process
was violated if a defendant’s retained counsel was prohibited
from assisting his client on any issue in the case.96 In Chewning
v. Cunningham, the last of the Betts line of cases, the majority
reversed the conviction and ten-year sentence pursuant to a
90 Betts, 316 U.S. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Black
explained, “Discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment by its sponsors in the Senate and
House shows their purpose to make secure against invasion by the states the
fundamental liberties and safeguards set out in the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 474 n.1. This
debate among the jurists is part of the incorporation debate, the discourse concerning
whether the entirety of the Bill of Rights was applicable to the states. Justice Black was
of the opinion that the Bill of Rights was applicable to the states. See, e.g., McDonald v.
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3033 (2010) (explaining that Justice Black championed the
theory that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated all Bill of Rights provisions, a
theory that the full Court never embraced). Thus, his dissent in Betts is entirely
consistent with his incorporation view.
91 See Betts¸ 316 U.S. at 475 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70 (1932)).
92 Nonetheless, during the Betts era, the Court strongly intimated that in
capital cases there was a per se rule requiring counsel. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961) (“When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel,
we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted.”). In 1954 the Court found
another basis for applying the right for granting indigents access to the criminal justice
system. Griffin v. Illinois held that both due process and equal protection required that
all indigents be given a transcript of the trial so that they could appeal. Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Although the state was not required to grant appellate
review, once it did, access could not be denied because of poverty. Id. at 18. Justice
Black pointedly noted that “the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to a defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Id. at 17–18. Following this decision,
the Griffin principle was extended even beyond Gideon. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S.
189 (1971) (unanimous court holding that an indigent defendant appealing convictions
of an ordinance violation punishable by fine only was entitled to a transcript). The case
goes beyond the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, which requires actual
imprisonment. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
93 See
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 350–51 (referring to Betts’s “special
circumstances” test).
94 Hamilton, 368 U.S. 52.
95 Id. at 53 (“Arraignment under Alabama law is a critical stage in a criminal
proceeding.”).
96 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) (characterizing counsel’s assistance
as an unqualified right).
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Virginia recidivist statute, the result of a trial at which the
defendant was denied legal representation.97 The Court
explained that the recidivism charge was so serious, the issues
were so complex, and the potential prejudice was so great, that
the denial of counsel constituted the denial of due process.98
Envisioning several issues that an imaginative attorney
could have put forth on behalf of his client, Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, concluded that the accused was
constitutionally entitled to legal representation.99 Chewning
signaled the ebb and flow of the Supreme Court’s right to
effective counsel jurisprudence. The following discussion
explores what has come to be the most celebrated right to
counsel case, Gideon v. Wainwright, and its legacy.
1. “Guiding Hand of Counsel at Every Step”
In August 1961, Clarence Earl Gideon, an indigent
drifter accused of stealing five dollars and some beer from a
pool hall, was charged with felony breaking and entering.100
Having no money to pay for a lawyer, Gideon requested that
the court appoint one for him, a request that was denied.101
Without the requested attorney, Gideon defended himself at
trial the best he could, by making an opening statement, crossexamining the State’s witnesses, presenting his own witnesses,
and making closing arguments.102 He even declined to testify on

97 See Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 447 (1962). The statute of
conviction provided that:

[W]hen it appears that a person convicted of an offense has been previously
sentenced “to a like punishment,” he may be tried on an information that
alleges “the existence of records of prior convictions and the identity of the
prisoner with the person named in each.” The . . . prisoner may deny the
existence of any such records, or that he is the same person named therein, or
both. If the existence of the records is denied, the court determines whether
they exist. If the court so finds and the prisoner denies he is the person
mentioned in the records or remains silent, a jury is impaneled to try that
issue. If the jury finds he is the same person and if he has one prior
conviction, the court may sentence him for an additional term . . . . If he has
been twice sentenced, the court may impose . . . additional sentence as it
“may deem proper.”
Id. at 443–44.
98 See id. at 446–47 (“In trials of this kind the labyrinth of the law is, or may
be, too intricate for the layman to master.”).
99 Id. “Double jeopardy and ex post facto application of a law are also questions
which . . . may well be considered by an imaginative lawyer, who looks critically at the
layer of prior convictions on which the recidivist charge rests.” Id. at 447.
100 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336–37 (1963).
101 See id. at 337.
102 Id.
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his own behalf.103 The jury convicted and sentenced Gideon to
five years.104 After his conviction, Gideon pursued state habeas
relief, which was denied.105 He then filed a handwritten request
for federal habeas relief.106 Although factually similar to Betts v.
Brady, which was decided more than thirty years earlier,107 the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, as the issue of whether
a criminal defendant had a per se federal constitutional right to
counsel in state felony cases had become a source of controversy
and litigation.108 In a unanimous decision,109 the Court overruled
Betts v. Brady,110 explaining that the Court in Betts had made
an “abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents.”111
Id.
Id.
105 Id.
106 See Records of Rights, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://recordsofrights.org/records/298/
gideons-handwritten-supreme-court-petition
[https://perma.cc/5H3C-5JQX]
(providing
National Archive’s image of Gideon’s handwritten petition to the Supreme Court); Facts and
Case Summary—Gideon v. Wainwright, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/educationalresources/educational-activities/facts-and-case-summary-gideon-v-wainwright
[https://per
ma.cc/6JEH-TXHN].
107 See discussion supra Section II.A (examining Betts v. Brady).
108 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337–38. The Court appointed Abe Fortas to
represent Gideon. Id. at 335, 338. Abe Fortas, a future Supreme Court Justice, was a
well-respected and competent lawyer. See LARA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY
(1992); BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE (1988).
109 Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336.
Justice Douglas joined the decision, yet wrote separately to emphasize that “rights
protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are not watered-down versions of what the Bill of Rights guarantees.” Id. at
347 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Clark wrote separately to speak to the distinction
that had been drawn over the years between the right to counsel in capital cases such as
Powell v. Alabama and the right to counsel in noncapital cases such as Gideon:
103
104

[T]he Constitution makes no distinction between capital and noncapital cases.
The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process of law for the deprival of
“liberty” just as for deprival of “life,” and there cannot constitutionally be a
difference in the quality of the process based merely upon a supposed difference
in the sanction involved.
Id. at 349 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Harlan concurred separately as well,
disagreeing with the majority’s statement that Betts v. Brady represented the Court’s
“abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents,” but Justice Harlan explained
that the application of Betts’s special circumstances rule by the state courts had
become unworkable. Id. at 344, 351 (Harlan, J., concurring). He continued, “To
continue a rule which is honored by this Court only with lip service is not a healthy
thing and in the long run will do disservice to the federal system.” Id. at 351.
110 See id. at 339 (majority opinion).
111 Id. at 343–44.
We accept Betts v. Brady’s assumption . . . that a provision of the Bill of
Rights which is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial” is made obligatory
upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts
was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.
See id. at 342.
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In commanding and persuasive language, harkening
generously back to the days of the Court’s decisions in Powell
and Zerbst,112 the Court emphasized the important role that
criminal defense attorneys play in any fair criminal justice
system.113 It aptly affirmed that “lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries.”114 It also stressed that both state and
national constitutions have in place protections to ensure that
defendants receive fair trials, and defense counsel is one of
those important safeguards.115 The Court quoted the powerful
words in Powell, which years earlier had stressed the
importance of effective criminal defense lawyering, holding
that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step.”116
Gideon v. Wainwright is an American gem—it was a
landmark opinion when it was issued and remains so today. It
is hailed as a critical opinion, not merely because it expanded
the fundamental right to counsel for the criminally accused in
state courts, but also because it appeared to embrace important
ideals of America: a poor man fought the state, asked for the
backing of the highest court in the land, and won.117 For
Clarence Earl Gideon, a person with no resources, the courts
worked to protect him from the dangers of an unfair conviction.
112 See id. at 343; see also supra notes 56–78 and accompanying text
(discussing the Powell and Zerbst opinions).
113 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343.
114 Id. at 344.
115 Id. (“[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious
truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. . . . That government hires
lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions
and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before
the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with a crime has to
face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”).
116 Id. at 345.

The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . He lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 344–45 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)).
117 The story of Clarence Earl Gideon was portrayed in a television movie
starring Henry Fonda as Clarence Gideon, Jose Ferrer as Abe Fortas, and John
Houseman as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. See GIDEON’S TRUMPET
(Worldvision 1980).
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As the Gideon Court explained, “[t]his noble ideal” that “every
defendant stands equal before the law” “cannot be realized if
the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without
a lawyer to assist him.”118 The danger to those defendants is an
unjust conviction. At that time, it appeared that the courts
were to operate justly to protect the rights of those who are
underprivileged, underrepresented, and often unheard.
2. Expansion of Right to Counsel
Gideon’s handwritten petition to the United States
Supreme Court did more than just usher in the extension of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in state felony trials. In the
years following Gideon, the principles it enunciated were
extended beyond the facts of that case. For instance, Douglas v.
California119—decided on the same day as Gideon120—held that
a criminal defendant pursuing a first appeal as of right was
entitled to the right to counsel within the meaning of the Due
Process and Equal Protection provisions of the Constitution.121
In Douglas, the state’s procedure for assigning counsel on
appeal did not comport with the Fourteenth Amendment’s
mandate of equality among defendants able to retain counsel
and indigent defendants forced to navigate the complexities of
direct appeal.122
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
120 Both Gideon and Douglas were decided on March 18, 1963. Douglas, 372
U.S. 353; Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
121 See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357. Unlike Gideon which was a Sixth
Amendment case, Douglas was based on Griffin v. Illinois’s due process and equal
protection analysis. Id. at 356–57; see supra note 92 (discussing Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956)); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (relying on the Equal
Protection Clause, holding criminal defendant entitled to “effective assistance of
counsel on first appeal as of right”).
122 See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357–58. However, years later when the Court was
asked to extend its ruling to discretionary appeals to the state court and the United
States Supreme Court itself, the Court denied the extension. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600, 610 (1974). Nonetheless, even while denying the right to counsel for
discretionary appeals, the Court described the value of an attorney in that context:
118

119

This is not to say, of course, that a skilled lawyer, particularly one trained in
the somewhat arcane art of preparing petitions for discretionary review,
would not prove helpful to any litigant able to employ him. An indigent
defendant seeking review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina is
therefore somewhat handicapped in comparison with a wealthy defendant
who has counsel assisting him in every conceivable manner at every stage in
the proceeding.
Id. at 616. The dissent argued:
[A]n indigent defendant is as much in need of the assistance of a lawyer in
preparing and filing a petition for certiorari as he is in the handling of an
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In 1972 the Court ruled that under the Sixth
Amendment a criminal defendant could not be imprisoned for
any offense—whether a misdemeanor or felony—unless the
defendant was afforded the assistance of counsel to aid in his
defense.123 In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court reversed the
conviction of Argersinger, an indigent defendant convicted of
the petty offense of carrying a concealed weapon in Florida
state court.124 After a trial before the bench and without the
benefit of legal counsel as requested, Argersinger was
sentenced to jail for ninety days.125 Reiterating that the
“assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence
of a fair trial,”126 the Court held that without a knowing and
intelligent waiver, no one may be imprisoned for any offense
unless represented by counsel at trial.127 The Court pronounced
that, as a federal constitutional matter, the “denial of the
assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail

appeal as of right. In many appeals, an articulate defendant could file an
effective brief by telling his story in simple language without legalisms, but
the technical requirements for applications for writs of certiorari are hazards
which one untrained in the law can hardly be expected to negotiate.
Id. at 620–21 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Brennan joined Justice
Douglas’s dissent. Id. at 619.
123 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
124 See id. at 26, 40.
125 Id. at 26.
126 Id. at 31.
127 Id. at 37. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the result, recognized that
the “holding of the Court today may well add large new burdens on a profession
already overtaxed, but the dynamics of the profession have a way of rising to the
burdens placed on it.” Id. at 44. Justice Brennan encouraged law students as well as
practicing attorneys to provide representation of the poor. Id. at 40 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Although he concurred in the result in this case, Justice Powell was
unwilling to agree with the Court that a person could never constitutionally be
imprisoned for a criminal offense if he had not been afforded the right to counsel at his
trial. Id. at 47 (Powell, J., concurring). Tying the right to counsel with the right to a
jury trial, he observed:
An unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial before a
judge experienced in piecing together unassembled facts, but before a jury the
guiding hand of counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent
whole consistent with the best case on behalf of the defendant. If there is no
accompanying right to counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes
meaningless. . . . [T]he interest protected by the right to have guilt or
innocence determined by a jury . . . while important, is not as fundamental to
the guarantee of a fair trial as is the right to counsel.
Id. at 46. Disagreeing with Chief Justice Burger’s expectation of the profession rising to
the challenge of any new burden created as a result of this ruling, Justice Powell
lamented that to require the appointment of counsel for every indigent charged with an
imprisonable offense will work a practical impossibility for many small town courts,
leaving them in the untenable position of being unable to enforce their own laws. See
id. at 61.
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sentence.”128 Relying in part on Gideon, the Argersinger Court
made clear that it was serving notice to all state court judges
that, when the trial of a misdemeanor begins, “no
imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits
it, unless the accused is represented by counsel.”129
In 1974 when presented with the issue of whether the
Due Process or Equal Protection provision required that
indigent defendants be entitled to counsel on discretionary
appeal to a state or federal court, the Court held in Ross v.
Moffit130 they did not.131 Similarly, in Scott v. Illinois,132 the
state convicted the defendant for an offense for which
imprisonment was authorized, but for which the state only
fined the defendant.133 Referring to the imposition of actual
imprisonment as the central premise of Argersinger, the Court
drew the line defining the right to a lawyer as the imposition of
actual imprisonment.134 In Nichols v. United States, the Court
concluded that a conviction obtained without counsel could be
used to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense that
resulted in imprisonment.135 Sadly, Scott and Nichols are
examples of cases in which there are serious repercussions to a
defendant and the trajectory of his life, but apparently not
serious enough to require a right to counsel in the Court’s view.
These limitations made the right to counsel in the Sixth
Amendment—arguably the most fundamental guarantee in the
amendment—less meaningful.136
128 Id. at 38 (majority opinion) (quoting Stevenson v. Holzman, 458 P.2d 414,
418 (Or. 1969) (en banc)).
129 Id. at 31–32, 40.
130 Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 602 (1974).
131 Id. at 600.
132 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
133 Id. at 368.
134 Id. at 373.
135 Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746–47 (1994). However, in
Alabama v. Shelton, the defendant, without a lawyer, was convicted of assault and
sentenced to thirty days in jail, a sentence that was immediately suspended in lieu of
two years of probation. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002). The Court held
that “a suspended sentence that may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s
liberty’ may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded ‘the guiding hand of
counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime charged.” Id. (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972)). The Court applied Argersinger’s “‘actual imprisonment’ rule,”
concluding that a “suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of
conviction.” Id. at 662. Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Kennedy and
Justice Thomas, disagreeing with the Court’s decision, as there had been no actual
imprisonment yet, and therefore no right to counsel. Id. at 674–75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136 The right to counsel as a matter of due process becomes much less likely as
the proceedings are attenuated from the criminal case. Thus, the Court has relied on
the Due Process clause in proceedings that were not viewed as criminal. See Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (holding that counsel must be granted to indigent
defendants at combined revocation and sentencing hearings). However, the Court
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The right to counsel being somewhat well defined, the
related determination of what was constitutionally required of
that counsel also began to be more thoroughly developed, as
described in the following section.
B.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Law Takes Shape

In the early 1970s, the Court began measuring whether
a criminal defendant had received constitutionally infirm
representation of counsel based on whether the attorney’s
conduct was “within the range of competence demanded of
lawyers in criminal cases.”137 Prior to that time,138 the standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel varied among the lower
courts.139 The low standards tolerated extreme misbehavior by
counsel,140 as long as the representation comported with

subsequently concluded that probation and parole revocation proceedings were not part
of the criminal process, and, therefore, there was no Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–90 (1973). Similarly in Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551 (1987), the Court held there was no federal constitutional right to counsel
for indigents seeking state habeas relief (which is a civil proceeding, not a criminal
proceeding), id. at 555, and in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), extended that
rule even to death row inmates seeking collateral review id. at 7, 10. See also
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 32, 42 (1976) (holding no right to counsel at
summary courts even though defendant was exposed to the maximum punishment of
thirty days’ confinement and hard labor).
137 See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) (“If a prisoner pleads
guilty on the advice of counsel, he must demonstrate that the advice was not ‘within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” (quoting McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))). Tollett was a federal habeas ineffective
assistance of counsel action in which the Court explained that defense counsel’s
principal value is to be a “faithful representation of the interest of his client.” Id. at
267–68. Three justices dissented from the majority opinion in Tollett. Id. at 258.
Justice Marshall, on behalf of the dissenters, countered that:
“[F]aithful representation of the interest of his client,” . . . means . . . that an
attorney must consult with the client fully on matters of constitutional
magnitude. Without such consultation, the representation of criminal
defendants becomes only another method of manipulating persons in
situations where the control over their lives is precisely what is at stake.
Id. at 272–73 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (quoting id. at 268
(majority opinion)).
138 Cases prior to this time included the so-called “Brady Trilogy” and Tollett.
See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 265–67. The Brady trilogy consists of Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 265–67 (referring to the Brady,
McMann, and Parker cases, in which habeas petitioners alleged deprivation of
constitutional rights preceding guilty pleas, as “the Brady trilogy”).
139 See, e.g., Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (describing the
standard as whether the trial proceedings “were a farce and a mockery of justice”).
140 See Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact
Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) (describing
misbehavior such as being “asleep, drunk, unprepared, or unknowledgeable” as passing
constitutional scrutiny in ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
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“fundamental fairness.”141 Following cases such as Brady and
Tollett, many courts embellished the competent counsel test of
Brady,142 requiring further that the range of competence be
within that of a fairly experienced criminal defense attorney or
an attorney acting as a diligent and conscientious advocate.143
Some lower courts began applying a “reasonably competent
counsel” test, not only to pleas but also to trials.144 Chief Judge
Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit urged for a checklist
approach setting forth the minimal competent duties that an
attorney must perform.145 Judge Bazelon’s approach focused on
the attorney’s performance and permitted courts to review that
performance without having to determine whether the
attorney’s acts or omissions affected the defendant’s substantive
rights.146 Thus, prejudice would be established upon a showing of
a substantial violation of the requirements provided in the test.
The substantive standards that Bazelon urged closely paralleled
those set forth in the American Bar Association (ABA)
standards. His proposed requirements included: conferring
with the client without delay and as reasonably necessary;
eliciting matters of defense; discussing strategies and tactical
choices fully; promptly advising the client of his or her rights;
taking all steps necessary to preserve those rights; and
conducting appropriate investigations, both factual and legal.147
When the Supreme Court finally spoke to this issue in the now
well-known case Strickland v. Washington discussed in the
following section, the Court rejected Bazelon’s checklist approach
as well as his suggestion that prejudice need not be established.148
In 1984 in the opinion Strickland v. Washington,149 the
Court defined the contours of the right to the effective assistance
141 “Fundamental fairness” was the due process standard used to determine
whether an indigent defendant was entitled to assistance of counsel in state criminal
trials. See discussion supra Section II.A.
142 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 757 (applying “competent counsel” inquiry in
assessing whether defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary and intelligently made).
143 See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(holding “defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney
acting as his diligent conscientious advocate”).
144 See id. at 1202 & nn.17–20 (identifying jurisdictions where the “reasonably
competent” counsel standard is applied even when accused proceeds to trial).
145 David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1,
32 (1973).
146 See id.; cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (adopting proof of
prejudice as part of the ineffective assistance of counsel calculus).
147 See DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197.
148 See discussion infra Section II.B (discussing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668).
149 Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Meredith J.
Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of
Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1 (2002).
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of counsel in trials and capital sentencing proceedings.150
Washington was indicted for various crimes, including capital
offenses.151 The State of Florida had appointed an experienced
criminal defense lawyer to assist him in his defense.152 Against
his lawyer’s advice, Washington confessed and pleaded guilty to
all charges pending against him, including the capital
offenses.153 Also against his lawyer’s advice, he opted to be
sentenced by the court instead of having an advisory jury
preside over his capital sentencing hearing.154 Washington’s
lawyer did very little investigation to uncover mitigating evidence
to present at sentencing on his client’s behalf.155 His attorney
argued instead against the imposition of the death penalty based
on his client’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility for
the crimes.156 The sentencing judge disagreed and sentenced
Washington to death.157 In a landmark decision, the Supreme
Court held that Washington received constitutionally sound legal
representation.158 The Court emphasized that in order to give the
process meaning, the Court must take the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment—that of ensuring a fair trial—as the guiding
principle.159 In other words, the issue was not just whether the
defendant received competent representation, but whether
the trial was fair.160 Writing for the majority of the Court,161
150 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683, 690–91 (explaining that subject to only one
exception, “the Court has never directly and fully addressed a claim of ‘actual
ineffectiveness’ of counsel’s assistance in a case going to trial”).
151 Id. at 672 (explaining that “[b]y the date set for trial,” Washington had
been indicted for “three counts of first-degree murder and multiple counts of robbery,
kidnaping for ransom, breaking and entering and assault, attempted murder, and
conspiracy to commit robbery”).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 672–73 (describing that although counsel spoke to Washington about
his background and called Washington’s wife and mother, he never followed-up with
his family in an effort to meet with them, did not seek out character witnesses, did not
request a psychiatric exam, and did not look for further evidence concerning
Washington’s character or emotional state).
156 Id. at 673.
157 Id. at 675.
158 Id. at 701.
159 Id. at 686. “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. “The purpose of the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 691–92.
160 Cf. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1090 (2014) (explaining that threat
to a fair criminal trial is maximized when the defense fails to understand resources
available to it).
161 Strickland, 466 U.S at 671. Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Id. at
670. Justice Brennan filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Id. at 701. He dissented, as he did in all capital cases affirming a sentence of death,
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Justice O’Connor defined the now well-known two-prong test
for establishing whether a criminal defendant received
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) whether
counsel’s performance was so deficient as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial and (2) whether the deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant’s case, which the Court defined as a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome would have been different.”162 An
ineffectiveness claim can be defeated on either prong; both prongs
need not be evaluated in disposing of a petitioner’s claim.163
Missing from the Strickland opinion is the soaring
language of Gideon and previous decisions, such as the
acknowledgment that a criminal defendant “requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step.”164 Instead, in Strickland
the majority spoke to the difficulties of representation and the
unfairness of judging a lawyer’s conduct with hindsight,
thereby requiring a strong presumption of a defense attorney’s
competence in representing a client, and even in the absence of
competent representation, presuming a lack of prejudice. The
adhering to his view that “the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual
punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 701 (Brennan,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
162 Id. at 694 (majority opinion). The fact that Washington’s claim of
ineffectiveness concerned the sentencing phase at his capital trial does not limit the
effect of the Court’s decision merely to the capital sentencing context:
A capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case . . . is
sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of
standards for decision . . . that counsel’s role in the proceeding is comparable to
counsel’s role at trial—to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to
produce a just result under the standards governing decision. For purposes of
describing counsel’s duties, therefore, Florida’s capital sentencing proceeding
need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial.
Id. at 686–87. The Strickland standards apply in challenges to representation in
habeas proceedings as well:
The principles governing ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal
collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions for a new
trial . . . An ineffectiveness claim . . . is an attack on the fundamental fairness
of the proceeding whose result is challenged. Since fundamental fairness is
the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus, no special standards ought
to apply to ineffectiveness claims made in habeas proceedings.
Id. at 697–98.
163 See id.
164 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (quoting Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)); see id. at 344 (“From the very beginning, our
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. . . . [L]awyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries.”); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[I]f
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants
cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel.”).
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Strickland Court established its now well-known two-prong
analysis to be applied in determining whether a criminal
defense attorney provided unconstitutional representation,
requiring proof of (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice.
1. Deficient Performance
An ineffective assistance of counsel petitioner must
establish that his defense attorney performed deficiently.165 The
Court defines deficient performance as failing to provide
“reasonably effective assistance”—representation that falls
“below an objective standard of reasonableness.”166 “Counsel’s
function is to assist the defendant,”167 assuring that the
“adversarial testing process work[ed] in the particular case.”168
The Court refused to provide specific guidelines of reasonably
effective assistance, but rather spoke of “reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.”169 Discussing at length that
there are innumerable ways to defend criminal defendants,170
the Court was loath to set forth any set of rules for attorney
conduct out of fear that specific guidelines would “interfere
with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and
restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical
decisions.”171 For example, the Court appeared to suggest that
an attorney’s strategic decisions are virtually unassailable,
including investigative decisions and choosing a theory of
defense.172 The Court instructed reviewing courts to be
“highly deferential” in scrutinizing a criminal defense
attorney’s performance.173 Moreover, courts are to indulge a
165 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88; see also Maryland v. Kulbicki, 136 S.
Ct. 2, 5 (2015) (explaining that “reasonable competence” is guaranteed within meaning
of right to counsel, but “perfect advocacy” is not).
166 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.
167 Id. at 688.
168 Id. at 690.
169 Id. at 688. “The Sixth Amendment . . . relies . . . on the legal profession’s
maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption that counsel will
fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions.” Id. (citing
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 100–01 (1955)).
170 Id. at 687–90. “Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend
a particular client in the same way.” Id. at 689.
171 Id.; see, e.g., Maryland v. Kulbicki, 136 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2015) (ruling that
defense counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to predict that comparative bullet
lead analysis would become discredited because the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct
is viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct).
172 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91 (“Strategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable.”); Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1088 (2014) (“Under Strickland,
‘strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible
options are virtually unchallengeable.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91)).
173 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
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“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance,”174 and
petitioners are required to overcome this strong presumption
that their attorney’s performance was a reasonable strategy
under the circumstances.175
The Strickland standard is insufficient in identifying
constitutionally infirm counsel. Syed’s case is instructive.
Consider Strickland’s deficient performance prong and
Christina Gutierrez’s representation of Adnan Syed.176 One of
the biggest mistakes that Gutierrez made in representing Syed
is that she failed to contact and investigate potential alibi
witness, Asia McClain. Syed had told Gutierrez that McClain
could testify that, at the time of Lee’s murder, Syed was with
McClain in the school’s library, making it impossible for him to
have killed Lee at the time the State alleged. Nonetheless, no
one from Gutierrez’s office reached out to McClain.177 In
considering Strickland’s deficient performance prong, counsel’s
investigatory decisions are to be given a “heavy measure of
deference.”178 However, since its ruling in Strickland, the Court
has further explained that defense counsel is constitutionally
required to investigate thoroughly any defense presented.179
However, Gutierrez’s defense of Syed was difficult to follow; it
was difficult to ascertain exactly what defense Gutierrez was
choosing to present (or whether she did, in fact, choose to
present a particular defense). Thus, Gutierrez’s failure to reach
out to McClain would not amount to a failure to investigate
thoroughly a defense she chose to present and would instead be
characterized as an investigatory decision, a decision which is
afforded that heavy amount of deference pursuant to
Strickland. Therefore, her decision not to contact McClain
would not amount to deficient performance pursuant to
Strickland.180 Similarly, regarding Gutierrez’s poor cross174
175

Id. at 690.

Id. at 689.
Id. “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance.”

176 See discussion supra Part I (describing attorney Christina Gutierrez’s
representation of Adnan Syed).
177 See Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 12.
178 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“[A] particular decision not to investigate
must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy
measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”).
179 See Elmore v. Holbrook, 137 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2016) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“[C]onstitutionally effective counsel must thoroughly investigate the
defense he chooses to present.”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526 (2003).
180 In fact, reviewing courts found that Gutierrez’s failure to investigate
McClain’s potential alibi did not constitute deficient performance pursuant to
Strickland. See Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 26.
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examination of the prosecution’s cell tower expert, whether and
how a criminal defense attorney cross-examines a prosecution
witness is generally considered a matter of strategy or tactic
pursuant to Strickland. The Court has ruled “time and [time]
again” that matters of strategy are virtually unchallengeable.181
However (and luckily), in response to Syed’s most recent
petition for post-conviction relief, the court ruled that
Gutierrez’s failure to cross-examine the cell tower expert
adequately amounted to deficient performance in violation of
Strickland. The court’s decision in which it found deficient
performance was somewhat (pleasantly) surprising because
whether and the manner in which an attorney conducts crossexamination is most often considered a matter of tactic or
strategy. As a tactical or strategical decision, such decisions are
subject to the heavy measure of deference called for in
Strickland. For whatever (fortuitous) reason, the court appears
to have relaxed Strickland’s deficient performance standard in
granting Syed relief. Despite the Maryland Court’s
protestations, it is hard to conclude that anything other than
Serial and the public interest resulted in the court finding that
Gutierrez’s conduct amounted to deficient performance in
violation of Strickland.182
2. Prejudice
In addition to establishing deficient performance, an
ineffective assistance of counsel petitioner must also
affirmatively prove that his attorney’s deficient conduct
prejudiced his case.183 The defendant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
Elmore, 137 S. Ct. at 8–9.
“Regardless of the public interest surrounding this case, the Court used its
best efforts to address the merits of [Syed’s] petition for post-conviction relief like it
would in any other case that comes before the Court; unfettered by sympathy,
prejudice, or public opinion.” Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 59.
183 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. The Court recognized some circumstances
in which a petitioner need not prove prejudice because prejudice may be presumed. See
id. Per se instances of prejudice include instances of active or constructive denial of a
lawyer altogether as well as “various kinds of state interference with [a lawyer’s]
assistance.” Id. In these circumstances, a petitioner is not required to prove prejudice:
“Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is
not worth the cost.” Id. Similarly, although not an application of the per se prejudice rule,
there is a “fairly rigid rule” of presumed prejudice when the criminal defense attorney
operated under an impermissible conflict of interest. Id. Differing from the per se
prejudice application, in the conflict of interest situation, “[p]rejudice is presumed only if
the defendant demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflicting interests ‘and
that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’” Id.
(quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980)).
181

182
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result of the proceeding would have been different.184 A
reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.”185 The Court stated that when a
petitioner challenges a conviction, the relevant inquiry is
“whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,
the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting [the
petitioner’s] guilt.”186 The petitioner must show that the
decision reached in his case would “reasonably likely have been
different absent the errors.”187 The Court requires reviewing
courts to presume that the judge or jury acted in accordance
with the law.188
In evaluating Strickland prejudice in Syed’s case, Syed
would have had to establish that Gutierrez’s failure to
investigate the potential alibi witness or her failure to crossexamine the State’s cell tower expert properly would have
changed the outcome of the proceeding. Or, stated differently,
the appropriate consideration is “the difference between what
was actually presented at trial and what competent counsel
could have presented.”189 Regarding the value of the alibi
witness’s testimony, the jury might have been convinced that
Syed could not have been at the location of Lee’s death, making
it impossible to have committed the crime. Or not. At Syed’s
184 The Court has reminded prisoners over the years that there is a distinction
between reasonably competent lawyering and what the Sixth Amendment requires of
lawyers. See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1112–13 (2013)
(explaining INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001)).
185 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Recognizing their strengths and weaknesses,
the Court rejected a more likely than not standard as well as a preponderance of the
evidence standard. Id. at 693–94. The Court based this prejudice prong analysis on
similar tests for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the
prosecution and the materiality of testimony made unavailable to the defendant by the
government’s deportation of a witness. Id. at 698 (citing United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
458 U.S. 858, 872–74 (1982); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). ).
186 Id. at 695 (“When a defendant challenges a death sentence . . . , the
question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death.”).
187 Id. at 696. An important thing to recognize is that in Strickland, the Court
emphasized that a showing of either lack of deficient performance or a lack of prejudice
could defeat a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 697. The Court suggested
that if a petitioner’s claim could be defeated on either prong, for the sake of judicial
efficiency, it should be defeated by just addressing the prong upon which the claim
fails. Id. In Syed’s situation, as discussed above, Syed’s claim of deficient performance
would likely have not prevailed. Therefore, reviewing courts would likely not even
consider the prejudice requirement.
188 See id. at 694–95. However, there are situations in which the Court has
recognized that prejudice need not be shown to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 162, 166 (2002) (explaining
prejudice need not be proven “where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or
during a critical stage of the proceeding”).
189 Elmore v. Holbrook, 137 S. Ct. 3, 9 (2016) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005)).
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trial, other evidence was presented to establish Syed’s presence
at the location of Lee’s murder.190 Therefore, it is not
“reasonably likely” that the addition of the alibi testimony
would have changed the result.
Similarly, in focusing on Gutierrez’s cross-examination
of the cell tower expert, a proper cross-examination might have
led the jury to conclude that Syed was not present at the
location of Lee’s death. Or not. The testimony of the alibi
witness or a proper cross-examination could have possibly led
the factfinder to reach a different conclusion, but it is a more
difficult question whether either was reasonably likely to lead
the factfinder to reach a different result. In applying for postconviction relief, without being able to establish that the result
probably would have been different, Syed cannot satisfy the
mandates of Strickland’s prejudice standard. The Strickland
standard is so difficult to satisfy that even cases in which it
seems obvious that a defendant received what should be
constitutionally infirm representation, the defendant is unable
to satisfy its burdensome requirements. In fact, Justice
Marshall’s dissent in Strickland was quite prescient in predicting
how “unhelpful” the majority’s analysis would prove to be.191
C.

The Weakening of Effective Assistance of Counsel Law

With impressive foresight, Justice Marshall skillfully
criticized both prongs of the Court’s new ineffective assistance
analysis,192 complaining that the deficient performance standard
is so malleable that it will eventually prove to be unhelpful.193 In
190 Memorandum Opinion II, supra note 1, at 26 (“Wild’s testimony and
Petitioner’s cell phone records created the nexus between Petitioner and the murder.”).
191 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
concurred in the majority’s opinion, but, adhering to his view that the death penalty
always establishes a constitutional violation, dissented in the judgment. Id. at 701
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In concurring with the Court’s
opinion, Justice Brennan expressed his belief that the Strickland standards “will both
provide helpful guidance to courts considering claims of actual ineffectiveness of
counsel and also permit those courts to continue their efforts to achieve progressive
development of this area of the law.” Id. at 702. Agreeing with the Court that detailed
rules for lawyer conduct was inappropriate, he stated his belief that “these standards
are sufficiently precise to permit meaningful distinctions between those attorney
derelictions that deprive defendants of their constitutional rights and those that do
not.” Id. at 703. “I am satisfied that the standards announced today will go far towards
assisting lower federal courts and state courts in discharging their constitutional duty
to ensure that every criminal defendant receives the effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 706.
192 See discussion supra Part II (describing deficient performance and
prejudice prongs of ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
193 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
complained that the Court’s instruction that criminal defense attorneys must act as a
reasonably competent attorney is “to tell them almost nothing.” Id. at 709.
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objecting to the requirement of prejudice, he explained the
difficulty that petitioners would face in proving whether a
convicted defendant would have received a different result if
represented by competent counsel.194 Disapproving of the
majority’s strong presumption of lawyer competence, Justice
Marshall cautioned against legitimizing convictions and
sentences obtained by incompetent criminal defense lawyering.195
Justice Marshall’s words in dissent in Strickland were
indeed prophetic. The test enunciated in Strickland is so
onerous that for years few claimants prevailed in bringing an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.196 Reviewing courts have
routinely legitimized incompetent attorney conduct upon
application of Strickland.197 Over the last thirty years, this
194 See id. at 710 (“The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are
exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing
from the record precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel. . . . [I]t seems
to me senseless to impose on a defendant whose lawyer has been shown to have been
incompetent the burden of demonstrating prejudice.”).
195 Id.
196 See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over
Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return
to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L.
127, 134 (2007) (explaining the Strickland standard as “virtually impossible” for
petitioners to meet); Stephen B. Bright, Essay, Counsel for the Poor: The Death
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994);
cf. Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of Counsel in the Sixth Amendment, 78
IOWA L. REV. 433, 499–504 (1993) (arguing that “death row prisoner who suffered at the
hands of an unqualified advocate often will be unable to satisfy the Strickland
standard”). Indeed, in Fretwell, decided a few years after Strickland, the Court seemed
to make a successful Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim nearly
impossible. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993). Fretwell seemed to engraft a
third prong on Strickland requiring that even if a defendant satisfied Strickland’s twoprong test, he may not prevail until he shows that the trial was not reliable, that is,
that he was not guilty. See id. at 372. This language seemed to make the right to
effective assistance of counsel available only to factually innocent people. See Meredith
J. Duncan, Lafler and Frye: Strickland Revitalized?, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 144, 145
(2012) (explaining how the Lafler Court put to rest questions of whether Sixth
Amendment protections are for those who may actually be guilty of the charged
offense). Fortunately, in Williams v. Taylor, the Court ultimately retreated from
Fretwell, and Lafler recognized that Sixth Amendment protections are to be afforded to
all criminal defendants, without regard to whether they are actually innocent.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000).
197 See, e.g., Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (rape defendant’s
attorney suffering from Alzheimer’s disease); Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 930 (5th
Cir. 1993) (aggravated robbery defendant’s attorney with alcohol abuse problem);
Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1987) (murder defendant’s attorney suffering from
mental illness); Hernandez v. Wainwright, 634 F. Supp. 241, 249 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(murder and robbery defendant’s attorney drunk during trial and consulted with client
without needed interpreter); Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985) (firstdegree murder defendant’s attorney with drug addiction problem); see also Kenneth B.
Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal
Process—a Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743 (1995) (“While trumpeting the necessity for effective assistance
of counsel, the Supreme Court has made it difficult for defendants to establish
ineffectiveness.”).
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standard has proven so difficult that even in the most egregious
of cases, a criminal defendant has little chance of success in
constitutionally challenging the poor legal representation he or
she received.198
As difficult as it is for prisoners to satisfy the mandates
of Strickland, proving their improper imprisonment became all
the more difficult when Congress enacted AEDPA, as explained
in the following section.
III.

WHAT STRICKLAND MADE DIFFICULT, AEDPA MADE
WORSE

Any conversation addressing the difficulty prisoners
face in securing post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance
would be incomplete without a discussion of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).199 As
explained below, in enacting AEDPA, Congress more severely
restricted the ability of the federal courts to consider habeas
claims.200 Strickland claims may be brought either on direct or
collateral appeal, depending on the requirements or procedures
of the individual state. Nevertheless, the tough standards set
forth in Strickland were made all the more difficult when
Congress enacted AEDPA.201
198 See Blume & Neumann, supra note 196, at 134 (explaining Strickland
standard barred nearly all claims of unconstitutional legal representation); see, e.g.,
Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding defense counsel’s nap during
client’s cross-examination did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because
nap did not prejudice client’s case); Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966, 975–77 & nn. 11–12
(Haw. 1993) (rejecting Strickland and its progeny as having an unduly restrictive view
of actions or omissions of counsel that constitute ineffective assistance and describing
Strickland standard as “too burdensome for defendants to meet because it imposes a
double burden upon defendants trying to show their counsel’s ineffective assistance,
resulting in a prejudice requirement almost impossible to surmount”).
199 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
200 Courts have been quite tough in interpreting the requirements of AEDPA.
See generally Yackle, supra note 7, at 330 (explaining how Supreme Court usually
interprets AEDPA to disadvantage of habeas petitioners); see, e.g., Woods v. Etherton,
136 S. Ct. 1149 (2016) (per curiam) (“When the claim at issue is one for ineffective
assistance of counsel . . . AEDPA review is ‘doubly deferential’ because counsel is
‘strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment . . . .’ . . . In such
circumstances, federal courts are to afford both the state court and the defense
attorney the benefit of the doubt.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Burt v. Titlow,
134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) (explaining that the Court has refused to sanction decisions
that would reflect negatively on a state court’s ability to safeguard the federal
constitution, “[e]specially where a case involves such a common claim as ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland—a claim state courts have now adjudicated in
countless criminal cases for nearly 30 years”).
201 See, e.g., Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 16 (“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to
federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.”).
The Burt majority explained that AEDPA’s standards are meant to be difficult to meet:
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In order to appreciate the impact of AEDPA, one must
understand the process for obtaining habeas relief. A habeas
appeal is a collateral (rather than a direct) appeal. A collateral
appeal is a civil proceeding in which a prisoner is afforded the
opportunity to establish that his or her state conviction is in
violation of law.202 State collateral appeals challenging the
validity of imprisonment assert state law claims and may
present federal claims as well.203 Federal collateral appeals
challenge the validity of imprisonment pursuant to federal law
only. When a state prisoner’s conviction rests upon an
independent and adequate state law ground, the common law
has long provided that the federal courts will not consider the
prisoner’s federal constitutional claim absent limited
exceptions; the prisoner’s confinement may be validated on
that adequate and independent state law ground.204 When
there is no adequate and independent state law ground, at
common law a federal court was permitted to consider on
habeas the prisoner’s constitutional claim.205 However, AEDPA
“We will not lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the
‘extreme malfunctio[n]’ for which federal habeas relief is the remedy.” Id. at 16
(alteration in original) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011));
see generally Nancy J. King, Non-capital Habeas Cases After Appellate Review: An
Empirical Analysis, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 308, 317 (2011) (describing the less than 1%
grant of habeas relief post-AEDPA, a figure lower than the success rate pre-AEDPA);
Michael M. O’Hear, Not So Sweet: Questions Raised by Sixteen Years of the PLRA and
AEDPA, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 223, 223 (2012) (describing AEDPA as “systemic failure”
and explaining how AEDPA placed severe restrictions on prisoners’ ability to challenge
the constitutionality of their imprisonment successfully).
202 See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1916–17 (2013) (explaining historical
importance of federal habeas as method for preventing person’s imprisonment in violation
of federal constitution). “In general, if a convicted state criminal defendant can show a
federal habeas court that his conviction rests upon a violation of the Federal Constitution,
he may well obtain a writ of habeas corpus that requires a new trial, a new sentence, or
release.” Id. at 1917.
203 In fact, Fourth Amendment claims may only be brought in state
proceedings. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 682–83 (1993) (reaffirming that
“when a State has given a full and fair chance to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim,
federal habeas review is not available to a state prisoner alleging his conviction rests
on evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure”); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 489–95 (1976) (“The question is whether state prisoners—who have been
afforded the opportunity for full and fair consideration of their reliance upon the
exclusionary rule with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial and on
direct review—may invoke their claim again on federal habeas corpus review. . . . [W]e
conclude that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of
a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure
was introduced at his trial.”).
204 See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1917 (explaining that state procedural default is
typically independent, adequate state law grounds making federal habeas review
inappropriate).
205 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991) (explaining history
of Supreme Court not reviewing questions of federal law on habeas when the state
court’s decision was based on independent and adequate state law grounds).
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modified the standard by which federal courts may review
prisoners’ requests for collateral habeas relief.206
AEDPA now provides the means by which a federal
court may grant habeas corpus relief to a person in the custody
of a state.207 The requirements of AEDPA are onerous and
challenging.208 As an initial matter, AEDPA codifies previously
existing common law by providing that a prisoner cannot be
granted federal habeas relief until he has exhausted all
available state remedies.209 However, AEDPA additionally
imposes new restrictions. For example, AEDPA provides that a
federal court “shall not” grant a prisoner’s habeas request unless
the state law conviction was the result of a decision contrary to
or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
“as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”210
Moreover, AEDPA contains “twin” presumptions that are
difficult to overcome:211 (1) any federal court considering a
prisoner’s habeas request must indulge a strong presumption
that the state’s factual determinations are correct;212 and (2)
any federal reviewing court is required to presume that defense
counsel’s conduct was competent.213 Prisoners are now required
206 See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 726 (explaining respect federal courts owe
states when reviewing federal habeas claims).
207 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012); see also White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct.
1697, 1701–02 (2014) (describing AEDPA as a “provision of law that some federal
judges find too confining, but that all federal judges must obey” and one that is
difficult to meet).
208 See generally O’Hear, supra note 201, at 223 (describing adoption of
AEDPA as “hardly exemplif[ying] Congress at its best” and describing AEDPA as
hurriedly adopted and not subject to vigorous vetting).
209 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); cf. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731 (explaining that
the “Court has long held that a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition should be
dismissed if the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies as to any of his
federal claims”).
210 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380
(2005). AEDPA also provides for relief when the state court decision was “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See, e.g., Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10 at 15
(2013) (reiterating “a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely
because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first
instance” (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010))).
211 See Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 19 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing “twin
presumptions” of AEDPA).
212 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 17. In Burt, the prisoner’s
defense counsel failed to acquire the file from client’s immediate previous attorney
before entering a guilty plea and accepted publication rights to his client’s story in
clear violation of the rules of professional responsibility. Id. at 13, 18. The Court, citing
Strickland, ruled that the defendant did not receive the ineffective assistance of
counsel because counsel is strongly presumed to have exercised reasonable professional
judgment. See id.
213 See, e.g., Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). (explaining that
petitioner “bore the burden of overcoming two presumptions: that [her attorney]
performed effectively and that the state court ruled correctly” (Sotomayor, J.,
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to rebut the presumed correctness of the state’s factual findings
by clear and convincing evidence.214
In enacting AEDPA, Congress intentionally sought to
limit habeas review in order to help ensure the finality of
criminal convictions.215 Since the passage of AEDPA, successful
habeas petitions have decreased dramatically.216 Despite the
criticism of the legislation, federal courts have defended the
legislation, citing concerns of comity and respect for state court
decisions.217 Further, the Supreme Court has explained that
concurring)). Of course, AEDPA’s requirement that federal reviewing courts must indulge
a strong presumption that the state’s factual findings are correct is a codification of
Strickland’s well-established competence inquiry. See supra notes 171–188 and
accompanying text (discussing Strickland presumptions). AEDPA also contains a oneyear statute of limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see Jonathan Atkins et al., Essay, The
Inequities of AEDPA Equitable Tolling: A Misapplication of Agency Law, 68 STAN. L. REV.
427, 427, 434 (2016) (explaining that with AEDPA, Congress employed for the first time a
one-year statute of limitations which unjustly restricts habeas relief to prisoners who
have been harmed by attorney errors).
214 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination
of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The
applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness
by clear and convincing evidence.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see, e.g., Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (2015) (explaining AEDPA’s
imposition of highly deferential standard and the clear and convincing evidence
standard in habeas cases); Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam).
In Woods, the petitioner was convicted at trial of felony murder and armed robbery.
Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1378. Petitioner pursued an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
because his trial attorney was not present in the courtroom for ten minutes during
which time the prosecution presented testimony concerning the petitioner’s
codefendants. Id. at 1375. The Court denied his request for habeas relief. Id. at 1378.
215 Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (explaining that AEDPA’s standards are
“intentionally difficult to meet”); Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 16 (describing AEDPA as a
purposeful, formidable barrier to habeas relief); see also Atkins et al., supra note 213,
at 432–34 (explaining how AEDPA proponents sought limits on federal habeas review
to ensure finality of criminal convictions); O’Hear, supra note 201, at 223–25
(explaining AEDPA from inception was designed to make federal habeas claims more
difficult to advance and opining that, in applying AEDPA, courts may have “created
greater harshness than was plainly mandated by the statutes”).
216 See Garrett, supra note 48, at 101 & n.173 (explaining in 2007 after the
passage of AEDPA, there was only 1 successful habeas petition out of 284, far lower
than 1% success rate pre-AEDPA).
217 See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013) (recognizing “the
importance of federal habeas corpus principles designed to prevent federal courts from
interfering with a State’s application of its own firmly established, consistently followed,
constitutionally proper procedural rules”); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012)
(explaining that federal habeas courts are “guided by rules designed to ensure that statecourt judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity
of the legal proceedings within our system of federalism”); Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 730 (1991) (“In the habeas context, the application of the independent and
adequate state ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism.”); see
also Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376; Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (describing state courts as adequate
forums for vindication of federal rights because under dual sovereignty system, “state
courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate
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AEDPA is a vote of confidence in favor of state courts that are
presumed to know and follow federal law.218 Federal reviewing
courts may only overturn state decisions when there has been
“extreme malfunctions” within the criminal justice system.219
Imagine Adnan Syed’s case in the AEDPA context. As
mentioned previously, the prosecution is currently appealing
the recent grant of relief in favor of Syed, in which the
Maryland court held that Syed received ineffective assistance
of counsel. However, if the state were to succeed in its appeal
and Syed apply for federal relief, AEDPA would prohibit any
federal court from considering Syed’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, despite that a state court had previously
found that Gutierrez provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
Syed would have to satisfy the requirements of AEDPA in order
to have a federal court consider his claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, to navigate the barriers of
AEDPA successfully, after establishing that he raised his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the state courts, Syed
would need to prove that his conviction “was contrary to, . . . [or]
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law,”220 a much more difficult undertaking. The clearly
established federal law would be Strickland, as Syed would be
raising a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel.221 Proving that his conviction was
contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland would
be challenging for at least two reasons. First, in evaluating the
Strickland claim, AEDPA requires the federal reviewing court
to indulge a strong presumption that the state court’s factual
findings were correct, namely that Gutierrez provided competent
representation or that Syed’s case was not prejudiced by her
claims arising under the laws of the United States” (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S.
455, 458 (1990))).
218 See Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,
24 (2002)).
219 See id. (“Federal habeas review . . . exists as a ‘guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error
correction through appeal.’” (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011))).
220 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012); see, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380
(2005). AEDPA also provides for relief when the state court decision was “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see, e.g., Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (reiterating “a
state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas
court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance” (quoting Wood v.
Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010))).
221 See, e.g., Elmore v. Holbrook, 137 S. Ct. 3, 8 (2016) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“The legal principles that govern claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
(IAC) come from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984), and were clearly
established over a decade before Elmore’s trial.”). The reviewing court would apply
Strickland’s two-prong test: deficient performance and prejudice.
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deficient performance. In rebutting the strong presumption of
competent representation, AEDPA requires Syed to present
clear and convincing evidence that Gutierrez’s representation
was deficient. If Syed’s clear and convincing evidence could
overcome the strong presumption of competent representation,
Syed would next have to establish that Gutierrez’s deficient
performance prejudiced his case. Again, AEDPA requires that
federal courts indulge the strong presumption that the state’s
factual finding of no prejudice was correct. The difficulty of
overcoming these strong presumptions and having to do so
with clear and convincing evidence would be challenging, to
say the least.
IV.

RECENT HOPEFUL GLIMPSES OF THE (PREVIOUSLY
FORSAKEN) VALUE OF EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

Despite the challenges of Strickland and AEDPA
barriers, recent (and somewhat surprising) Supreme Court cases
have noted the importance of the right to counsel,222 and
ineffective assistance of counsel petitioners have actually
prevailed in their lawsuits.223 For example, in Williams v.
Taylor,224 the petitioner confessed to homicide and “was
convicted of robbery and capital murder.”225 At his sentencing
hearing, one of the petitioner’s attorneys—a person whose sole
responsibility was to protect petitioner’s interests—devoted
much time explaining to the jury how difficult it was to find a
reason that would justify sparing his client’s life.226 The
attorney did not present evidence in mitigation of a death
sentence,227 and the jury sentenced the petitioner to death.228
The petitioner filed for state habeas relief,229 and the same
judge who had presided over his capital murder trial and
sentencing hearing concluded that petitioner’s trial attorneys
222 See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012) (“[T]he right to the
effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice
system. . . . Indeed, the right to counsel is the foundation of our adversary system.”).
223 See, e.g., id. at 1309; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 362 (2000); cf. Hinton v. Alabama,
134 S. Ct. 1081, 1081–83 (2014) (in which petitioner’s claim was remanded to the lower
court’s determination of Strickland’s prejudice prong after the Court ruled that
petitioner’s trial attorney provided deficient performance in failing to seek additional
funds to hire an expert witness because attorney had mistaken belief that available
funding was capped).
224 Williams, 529 U.S. at 367.
225 Id. at 368.
226 Id. at 369 & n.2.
227 Id. at 369.
228 Id. at 370.
229 Id.
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had indeed rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
to present mitigating evidence at sentencing.230 On appeal by
the state, the Virginia supreme court reversed, ruling that
petitioner failed to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland.231
In a somewhat surprising decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted petitioner’s request for federal habeas relief,232
ruling that he was entitled to relief because the Virginia
supreme court’s ruling was both contrary to and involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
namely Strickland v. Washington.233 First, the Court ruled that
the Virginia supreme court mischaracterized the appropriate
applicable federal rule in that it incorporated Lockhart v.
Fretwell234 into its reasoning rather than relying solely on
Strickland.235 Second, the Court concluded that the Virginia
supreme court failed to evaluate the totality of the available
evidence in mitigation of petitioner’s crime.236 In sum, the
majority ultimately agreed with the Virginia state trial court
that there “existed ‘a reasonable probability that the result of
the sentencing phase would have been different’ if the jury had
heard [the omitted mitigating] evidence.”237
230 Id.; see infra Section V.C (recommending that judges report misconduct
they witness).
231 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 372 (concluding that “there was no reasonable
probability that the omitted evidence would have affected the jury’s sentencing
recommendation . . . and that Williams had failed to demonstrate that his sentencing
proceeding was fundamentally unfair”).
232 Id. at 391.
233 Id.; see discussion supra Part III (regarding AEDPA requirements, inter
alia, that state ruling was contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law as articulated by the Supreme Court). The justices disagreed
over the appropriate application of habeas relief. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365–66. Justice
Stevens wrote for the Court. Id. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in his
opinion in its entirety. Id. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joined in the part of his
decision discussing the factual history of the case as well as the discussion of the
appropriate application of Strickland v. Washington. Id. They did not join in Justice
Steven’s discussion of the application of the habeas statute, AEDPA. Id. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence. Id. But for a
footnote, Justice Scalia joined Justice O’Connor’s concurrence as well. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part. See id.
234 Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
235 Williams, 529 U.S. at 397.
236 See id. at 397–98.
237 Id. at 399. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
disagreed that Williams was denied the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See
id. at 419 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice
Rehnquist first disagreed that the Virginia Supreme Court had relied on Lockhart v.
Fretwell in its decision. Id. at 417. Rather, Rehnquist claimed, the state court had
appropriately relied on Strickland v. Washington. Id. at 417–18. Assuming without
deciding that Williams’s lawyers’ conduct was unreasonable, the dissenting justices
concluded that it was not unreasonable for the Virginia Supreme Court to conclude
that Williams’s case was not prejudiced. Id. at 418–19 (providing that it was not
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The Williams case may signal a change. At a minimum,
it provided hope for ineffective assistance of counsel petitioners
where there had been little cause for hope in over thirty years.
Three years after Williams, the Court decided Wiggins v.
Smith, another opinion in which the prisoner prevailed in
acquiring federal habeas relief.238 The petitioner in Wiggins was
represented by two public defenders and, after a four-day
bench trial, was found guilty of first degree murder, robbery,
and theft.239 After Wiggins chose to be sentenced by a jury, one
of the petitioner’s attorneys informed the jury that it would
hear evidence in mitigation of the offenses of conviction.240
Petitioner’s counsel never presented such evidence, and the
jury sentenced petitioner to death.241 Denied relief in the state
courts, Wiggins sought federal habeas relief. In another
surprising decision, the Supreme Court granted relief.242
Justice O’Connor (the author of the majority’s opinion in
Strickland) wrote on behalf of the majority in Wiggins. Citing
Williams v. Taylor243 as the proper application of the Strickland
standards, the Court focused not on whether Wiggins’s
attorneys should have presented a mitigation case, but rather
on Wiggins’s attorneys’ investigation regarding the
reasonableness of introducing mitigating evidence.244 The Court
unreasonable for the Virginia Supreme Court to conclude that “a jury would not have
been swayed by evidence demonstrating that petitioner had a terrible childhood and a
low IQ”). Admittedly, Williams discussed supra and Wiggins discussed here create
what is essentially a special type of ineffective assistance of counsel claim that pertains
only to punishment phase claims in capital cases not just capital offenses. However, at
least one author has argued that these recent Supreme Court cases should be applied
to all criminal prosecutions. See Smith, supra note 4, at 537.
238 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
239 Id. at 514–15.
240 Id. at 515–16.
241 Id. at 516.
242 See Mickenberg, supra note 5, at 326 (describing Court’s decision in
Wiggins as “surprise to almost everyone”); see also Blume & Neumann, supra note 196,
at 135 (explaining Strickland standard barred nearly all claims of unconstitutional
legal representation).
243 See discussion supra notes 231–246 and accompanying text.
244 See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523.
Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of
mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the
defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to
present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case. Both conclusions
would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel
at the heart of Strickland. We base our conclusion on the much more limited
principle that strategic choices made after less than complete investigation
are reasonable only to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation . . . . Counsel’s investigation into
Wiggins’ background did not reflect reasonable professional judgment.
Id. at 533–34.
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concluded that defense counsel’s failure to investigate
thoroughly was a result of inattention rather than reasoned
strategic judgment and was, therefore, unreasonable.245 In
applying Strickland’s prejudice prong, the Court concluded that
there existed a reasonable probability that the jury would have
returned a sentence different than death.246 Justices Scalia and
Thomas dissented.247 Complaining that the majority disregarded
Wiggins’s trial attorneys’ testimony in reaching its conclusion
that his attorneys’ investigation was unreasonably incomplete,248
Justice Scalia also accused the majority of failing to respect
state court factual determinations that have not been rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence, which is, of course, the
standard set by AEDPA.249
The majority’s opinion in Wiggins is extraordinary.250
The Wiggins Court chastised the Maryland courts for applying
the Strickland standards as if they are standards virtually
impossible to overcome,251 despite the fact that the Maryland
court sought to apply Strickland as courts have routinely
applied it for the two decades prior to its decision. Wiggins is
promising, but the more intellectually honest approach would
be to fashion a more workable and descriptive test for
ineffective assistance of counsel.252 Although encouraging
(inasmuch as prisoners were granted relief and the seemingly
insurmountable requirements of Strickland were deemed
satisfied), both Williams and Wiggins still indicate that the
current ineffective assistance standard is impotent and in need
of modification.253

Id. at 534–35.
Id. “Had the jury been able to place petitioner’s excruciating life history on
the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror
would have struck a different balance.” Id. at 537.
247 Id. at 538 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248 Id.
249 Id. But see discussion supra Part III suggesting a change from AEDPA’s clear
and convincing standard.
250 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 526–27 (majority opinion) (The “‘strategic decision’ the state courts and
respondents all invoke to justify counsel’s limited pursuit of mitigating evidence
resembles more a post hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct than an accurate
description of their deliberations prior to sentencing.”).
252 See supra Part IV (suggesting new standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims).
253 See, e.g., Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1090 (2014) (deciding only
issue of whether attorney provided deficient performance, but remanding on the issue
of prejudice); cf. Donald Gifford, Introduction & Keynote Speakers to Symposium,
Gideon—a Generation Later, 58 MD. L. REV. 1333, 1333 (1999) (“To declare a legal right
is one thing. To enact it in a meaningful way is quite another.”).
245
246

2017]

“LUCKY” ADNAN SYED

1691

Even more encouraging than Williams and Wiggins is
Martinez v. Ryan.254 In Martinez, an Arizona state prisoner was
prohibited by state statute from asserting an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.255 On state habeas
appeal, the prisoner, now represented by new counsel, did not
raise an ineffectiveness claim.256 Subsequently, when seeking
federal habeas relief—and represented yet again by new
counsel—the prisoner argued for the first time that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial stage as well
as on collateral appeal.257 The State sought to block his
ineffectiveness claims on the ground that the trial stage claim
was not presented in the state collateral proceeding, so it could
not be considered by the federal court and that there was no
right to effective assistance of counsel on collateral appeal.258
Justice Kennedy writing on behalf of the majority disagreed,
explaining that if the federal courts denied the petitioner’s
request for habeas relief, the claims were likely never to be
considered by any court at any level.259 Harkening back to
Gideon, the majority proclaimed “[t]he right to the effective
assistance of counsel . . . is a bedrock principle to our justice
system.”260 The majority so ruled over a scathing dissent,261
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
Id. at 1314.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 1314–15.
259 Id. at 1313, 1316–17.
260 Id. at 1317–18 (“Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the absence of an
attorney) caused a procedural default in an initial-review collateral proceeding
acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that the initial-review collateral proceeding, if
undertaken without counsel or with ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to
ensure that proper consideration was given to a substantial claim.”).
261 In an extremely critical dissent joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
argued that the majority’s ruling essentially authorized a prisoner to receive postconviction effective assistance of counsel, despite the Court’s well-established
precedent. Id. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia began his dissent:
254

255

Let me get this straight: Out of concern for the values of federalism; to preserve
the ability of our States to provide prompt justice; and in light of our
longstanding jurisprudence holding that there is no constitutional right to
counsel in state collateral review; the Court . . . abstains from holding that
there is a constitutional right to counsel in initial-review state
habeas. . . . Instead, . . . the Court holds that . . . failing to provide assistance of
counsel, or providing assistance of counsel that falls below the Strickland
standard, constitutes cause for excusing procedural default. The result, of
course, is precisely the same.
Id.; see also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1924 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting for
reasons set forth in Martinez). That same year the Court decided Chaidez v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013), a case in which Justice Scalia joined the majority. Id. at
1105. The petitioner in Chaidez was denied collateral relief. Id. at 1106 (Although the
petitioner did not seek federal habeas relief, the case is still instructive in the habeas
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which complained that the majority’s ruling was contrary to
established precedent indicating that a prisoner is not entitled
to the effective assistance of counsel on collateral appeal.262 The
majority described defense counsel’s function as one of
ensuring that the proceedings adjudicate guilt or innocence,
while at the same time protecting the rights of the accused.263
The Martinez majority finely parsed the snares of
AEDPA.264 The Court distinguished between a prisoner’s cause
for the procedural default of his habeas claim and the
prisoner’s grounds for the grant of federal habeas relief.265 As to
the former (and at issue in Martinez), the Court held that
AEDPA does not bar a prisoner from having a federal court
consider attorney error during a collateral proceeding as a
cause for procedurally defaulting on his federal habeas claim.266
As to the latter, the Court agreed that AEDPA bars a prisoner
from asserting attorney error arising during collateral
proceedings as grounds for granting federal habeas relief.267
Regarding whether Martinez could establish the cause for the
procedural default of his habeas claim, the Court explained that
the federal court could properly consider the ineffectiveness of
context.). Chaidez was not imprisoned at the time of her request for relief from the
federal courts. Id. at 1106 & n.1. Because she was not imprisoned at the time she was
seeking relief, a writ of habeas was improper. Id. She sought a writ of coram nobis, a
writ providing a means of collaterally attacking a criminal conviction when the person
is no longer in custody. Id. at 1106 & n.1 (explaining that parties agreed that any
distinction between a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of coram nobis was insignificant
issue before Court). Upon the advice of counsel, Chaidez pleaded guilty to two counts of
mail fraud. Id. Under federal immigration law, her plea subjected her to mandatory
deportation, a consequence about which her attorney failed to inform her. Id. Although
Padilla v. Kentucky had previously held that the Sixth Amendment required a criminal
defense attorney to advise clients about any risks of deportation arising from guilty
pleas, the Court had not yet determined whether Padilla was retroactive, which was
the issue in Chaidez. Id. A majority of the Court refused to grant relief to the
petitioner, ruling that Padilla announced a “new rule” within the meaning of Teague v.
Lane and thus was not retroactive. Id. at 1107–13.
262 See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1326 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989));
see also Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1919 (holding Martinez applies when state systemically
affords no meaningful review of trial counsel on direct appeal). “[T]he Texas procedural
system—as a matter of its structure, design, and operation―does not offer most
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel on direct appeal.” Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921.
263 Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
The majority also recognized that Arizona’s deliberate decision to prevent direct appeal
of prisoners’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims significantly diminishes prisoners’
ability to file such claims. Id. at 1318.
264 Id. at 1320–21.
265 Id. at 1320; cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (distinguishing
application of independent and adequate state ground doctrine in federal habeas and
upon direct appeal).
266 Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
267 Id.

2017]

“LUCKY” ADNAN SYED

1693

his post-conviction counsel because such consideration was not
presented to establish that Martinez actually received
ineffective assistance on appeal, but rather to establish the
mistakes that caused his procedural default.268 Remanding the
action to the lower court, the Court never reached the issue of
the grounds for his requested habeas relief.269 The dissent’s
complaint that the majority disregarded established precedent
disallowing a prisoner’s right to effective counsel on habeas
seems premature as the majority never reached that issue.
Because Adnan Syed’s case is currently in the state
courts, his case has not been (and may never be) considered by
the federal courts. Although opinions such as Williams,
Wiggins, and Martinez are positive indicators of the Court’s
willingness to (once again and in the spirit of Gideon) protect
criminal defendants’ right to the effective assistance of counsel,
these cases likely will not benefit most ineffective assistance of
counsel petitioners,270 including petitioners like Syed. It is
conceivable that both Williams and Wiggins will be confined to
the capital context. Syed is not a capital defendant. Similarly,
both Williams and Wiggins may be confined to the sentencing
stage of one’s trial. Of course, Syed’s attorney’s errors did not
occur at sentencing. Regarding Martinez, although a noncapital
case, Martinez is a quite narrow ruling based on Arizona’s
particular procedural rule requiring that ineffective assistance
of counsel claims be raised on collateral rather than direct
appeal. No such procedural rule applies in Maryland, where
Syed’s case is. Likewise, Syed has raised his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in the state court, so Martinez
would likely not be helpful. On the other hand, Wiggins, if not
limited to the capital sentencing context, may prove more
268 Id. “To overcome the default, a prisoner must also demonstrate that the
underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to
say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Id. at 1318.
269 Id. at 1313 (describing issue before Court as “whether a federal habeas court
may excuse a procedural default of an ineffective-assistance claim when the claim was
not properly presented in state court due to an attorney’s errors in an initial-review
collateral proceeding”). As to the alleged ineffectiveness of Martinez’s trial counsel,

Martinez claimed [in his second notice of state post-conviction relief that] his
trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge the prosecution’s
evidence. . . . for example, that his trial counsel should have objected to the
expert testimony explaining the victim’s recantations or should have called an
expert witness in rebuttal. Martinez also faulted trial counsel for not pursuing
an exculpatory explanation for [incriminating evidence presented at trial].
Id. at 1314.

270 Cf. King, supra note 6, at 2431 (arguing that “Martinez will make little
difference in either the enforcement of the right to the effective assistance of counsel or
the provision of competent representation”).
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useful to Syed if he were to pursue federal habeas relief
inasmuch as the Wiggins majority concluded that defense
counsel’s failure to investigate adequately amounted to
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Syed’s case, his attorney
Christina Gutierrez similarly failed to investigate adequately.
Although not especially helpful to Syed, Williams, Wiggins, and
Martinez are important to ineffective assistance of counsel
jurisprudence as they seem to signal a small, yet positive
reshaping of existing effective assistance of counsel law.
The next section provides holistic suggestions on how
criminal defense lawyering may be improved by changes at
various levels of the criminal justice system—by the Supreme
Court, by Congress, by jurists, by prosecutors, and by criminal
defense attorneys.271
V.

EXCITING TIMES, BUT NOT ENOUGH

With the changing position of both the Court as well as
societal attitudes toward the unjustly imprisoned, the time
seems ripe to make holistic changes designed to ensure that a
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel is adequately protected.272 More and more,
there seems to be sympathy for the notion that the process of
asserting one’s constitutional rights should not be part of the
punishment to which a prisoner is subjected.273 The following
section will propose changes that may be implemented at
various stages of the criminal justice system, all toward the
goal of providing more robust Sixth Amendment protection.
The suggested changes propose modifications at the Supreme
Court level, the Congressional level, the judicial level, the
prosecutorial level, and the defense level. Any one of the
following suggestions would help to address the problems of poor
representation of defense counsel in the criminal justice system,
but enactment of all the following suggested improvements
would be most ideal in correcting the wrongs of poor defense
representation in criminal matters.
271 Protection of criminal defendants by facilitating civil action against their
negligent attorneys is a subject addressed in a previous piece. See Meredith J. Duncan,
Criminal Malpractice: A Lawyer’s Holiday, 37 GA. L. REV. 1251 (2003).
272 See generally O’Hear, supra note 201 (considering alternatives to federal
courts in protecting prisoners’ constitutional rights).
273 Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Essay, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101
VA. L. REV. 395, 396–97, 431–33 (2015) (evaluating DNA-driven exonerations of several
prisoners, some who spent decades in prison, based on contaminated confessions and
explaining how the criminal justice system itself contributed to prolonged sentences
despite constitutional violations).
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At the Supreme Court Level, Strickland Should Be
Revamped

The system’s method of evaluating the constitutionality
of criminal defense lawyering needs to be enhanced.274 The
Court should implement a new ineffective assistance of counsel
standard by which courts consider whether a criminal defendant
has received meaningful representation.275 The new standard
should be flexible enough not to interfere with the independence
of criminal defense counsel, and at the same time provide a more
meaningful evaluation of criminal defense lawyering.276 The
proposed test stems in part from decisions by the Supreme
Court of Hawaii and the New York Court of Appeals.277 As
discussed more fully below, whether one received ineffective
assistance of counsel should not be established based on
presumptions that defense counsel’s conduct was reasonable,
274 See Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of
Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (1986) (arguing that the Strickland test
“undermines the goal of the Sixth Amendment—[achieving] a just result . . . through a
proper adversarial proceeding”).
275 Some courts refusing to adopt Strickland standards, but instead willing to
provide more protection for criminal defendants, speak of the Sixth Amendment right
to the effective assistance of counsel in terms of “meaningful representation”—namely
whether the law, the evidence, and the circumstances of a case taken together indicate
that the legal representation was meaningful. See, e.g., People v. Benevento, 697
N.E.2d 584, 587 (N.Y. 1998); cf. Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty
Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986)
(declaring that the “severe rules the Court has adopted to assure that the trial is the
‘main event’ have been unaccompanied by measures to ensure the fairness and
accuracy of that event” (footnote omitted)).
276 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89 (refusing to create
specific guidelines regarding reasonable attorney conduct out of concern that “[a]ny
such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions”);
cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (explaining that “while the Strickland
test provides . . . guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims, there are situations in which the overriding focus on fundamental fairness may
affect the analysis”); Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587 (“[T]he phrase ‘effective assistance’
is not, however, amenable to precise demarcation applicable in all cases.”).
277 See, e.g., Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 584; Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966
(Haw. 1993). Rejecting the Strickland standard, Hawaii has adopted a “meaningful
representation” standard in ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See State v. Smith,
712 P.2d 496, 500 (Haw. 1986) (explaining that the appropriate inquiry is “whether,
[when] viewed as a whole, the assistance provided . . . [was] ‘within the range of
competence demanded of lawyers in criminal cases.’” (quoting State v. Kahalewai, 501
P.2d 977, 979 (Haw. 1972))). For example, a petitioner bringing an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim in Hawaii must “show specific errors or omissions . . . reflecting counsel’s
lack of skill, judgment or diligence.” Briones, 848 P.2d at 976 (omission in original)
(quoting State v. Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 104 (Haw. 1980)); see also Benevento, 697 N.E.2d
at 586 (also applying meaningful representation standard and explaining that giving
effective representation “generally means [providing] . . . ‘reasonably competent
services . . . devoted to the [defendant’s] best interests’” (quoting People v. Ortiz, 76
N.Y.2d 652, 655–56 (N.Y. 1990))).
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but rather should be based on an analysis of whether a lawyer’s
objectively unreasonable conduct substantially impaired the
client’s potentially meritorious defense.
1. Eliminate Strickland Presumptions
The Court should eliminate the “strong presumption”
that defense counsel’s conduct was reasonable.278 In the words of
Justice Marshall in his Strickland dissent, “[t]o afford attorneys
more latitude, by ‘strongly presuming’ that their behavior will fall
within the zone of reasonableness, is covertly to legitimate
convictions and sentences obtained on the basis of incompetent
conduct by defense counsel.”279 In a system that routinely tolerates
poor lawyering as the norm, there is no reason for presuming, in
a case challenging the constitutionality of that lawyering, that the
lawyer’s conduct was reasonable.280 There is even less justification
for indulging a strong presumption of reasonableness281 or even
worse a “doubly deferential standard of review.”282

278 See discussion supra Section II.B.1 (explaining Strickland’s strong
presumption of reasonable professional assistance).
279 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 713 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also discussion
supra Section II.C (discussing Justice Marshall’s dissent in Strickland).
280 See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty
Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 625, 641 (1986) (explaining that Strickland’s requirement that deference
be given to attorney’s conduct undermines the adversary system); see generally
Duncan, supra note 149 (explaining how system’s inability to hold criminal defense
attorneys accountable at any level—constitutional, civil, and disciplinary levels―has
resulted in unacceptably low quality criminal defense lawyering); Matthew J.
Fogelman, Justice Asleep Is Justice Denied: Why Dozing Defense Attorneys Demean the
Sixth Amendment and Should Be Deemed Per Se Prejudicial, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 67
(2002) (arguing per se prejudice should be established when attorney sleeps during
trial and should trigger new trial); Jeffrey Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers
Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147,
148 (2001) (discussing case of Betty Lou Beets and explaining that her lawyer operated
under impermissible conflict of interest in that he could have been a life-saving witness
for her because he had previously represented her and knew that she did not kill her
husband for the purpose of acquiring insurance money).
281 See Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in
Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 691–92 (2003) (discussing Montana Supreme
Court’s decision in In re Mental Health of K.G.F. in which court refused to apply
Strickland in challenge to quality of counsel in involuntary commitment proceeding,
claiming that Strickland was lacking because its linchpin—“‘reasonable professional
assistance’ . . . ‘cannot be presumed in a proceeding that routinely accepts—and even
requires—an unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and generally disdains
zealous, adversarial confrontation’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; In re Mental
Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 492 (Mont. 2001))).
282 See, e.g., Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013) (reversing petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because Sixth Circuit failed to apply AEDPA’s “doubly
deferential standard of review,” which requires a federal reviewing court to “give[ ] state
court and defense attorney benefit of doubt”); see supra Part III (explaining AEDPA).
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Indulging a strong presumption of competent lawyering
unnecessarily tilts the scales against the prisoner.283 In
determining the constitutionality of legal representation, the
scales should not be tilted in favor of either party—not the
prisoner and not the government. The purpose of ineffective
assistance of counsel law is not to facilitate a finding of
incompetent lawyering; neither should it be about hindering a
finding of constitutionally infirm lawyering. An ineffective
assistance of counsel claim should be about determining
whether a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights were
violated, a determination that should be made without one side
benefitting from presumptions.
It is unclear why criminal defense counsel, who are
notoriously overworked, understaffed, and often work for less
than seventy dollars an hour, should be presumed to have
performed competently in representing their clients.284
Recognizing a presumption of criminal defense attorney
competence is not supported by current well-documented realities
of criminal defense law practice.285 Many criminal defendants
(and almost all indigent defendants) are represented by public
defenders or appointed counsel, who—through no fault of their
own—are shamefully understaffed and overworked, so much so
that recently, at least one public defender office has had to
refuse cases of needy defendants due to a lack of resources.286
283 The current Strickland deficient performance examination is similar to a
tort negligence standard, as it requires counsel’s conduct to be “reasonable.” However,
a tort defendant enjoys no presumption of competent conduct in a negligence action.
Rather, in a negligence action, it is the plaintiff who must establish the standard of
conduct as well as prove that the defendant’s conduct fell below that standard.
Similarly, a lawyer, the subject of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, should not
enjoy a presumption of competent lawyering.
284 See, e.g., ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM AND
ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_the_missouri_project_report.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/BFH8-NLR7] (finding excessive defense counsel
workloads contributing to ineffective assistance of criminal defendants).
285 See id.
286 See, e.g., ACLU Suing New Orleans, State of Louisiana over Public
Defender Shortage, GREATER BATON ROUGE BUS. REP. (Jan. 15, 2016), https://
www.businessreport.com/article/aclu-suing-new-orleans-state-louisiana-public-defendershortage [https://perma.cc/VB3T-U59U] (describing chronically underfunded public
defender system as “constitutional crisis”); Jesse Coburn, Maryland Public Defenders
Juggle Heavy Caseloads; Critics Say Indigent Clients Suffer, BALT. SUN (Aug. 20, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-public-defendercaseloads-20160819-story.html (describing understaffed and underfunded public
defender systems across country); Mori Rothman, Wait List Grows as Public Defenders
Refuse Cases in New Orleans, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 1, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/wait-list-grows-as-public-defenders-refuse-cases-in-new-orleans/ [https://
perma.cc/YA3L-P24Q].
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Moreover, counsel who are appointed to represent criminal
defendants are woefully undercompensated. A recent study
revealed that appointed counsel across thirty states were
compensated at an average rate of less than sixty-five dollars
per hour.287
The elimination of presumptions in ineffective
assistance of counsel determinations would still protect a wide
range of tactical or strategic choices that a criminal defense
attorney may have employed, choices that should be properly
protected from constitutional challenge.288 However, the burden
of establishing that the defense attorney’s decisions were a
matter of strategy or tactic would be placed on the government
rather than on the prisoner,289 and strategic choices must be
proven reasonable.290 Criminal defense performance would need
not be errorless. The prisoner would still have to prove that the
attorney’s conduct fell outside of a range of reasonably
acceptable lawyer conduct.291 However, the prisoner would not
have to disprove unnecessary, unfounded presumptions.
Elimination of the presumptions will allow the state and the
prisoner to start on level footing in analyzing whether the
prisoner’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated.

287 See JOHN P. GROSS, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, GIDEON AT
50: A THREE-PART EXAMINATION OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN AMERICA, PART I, RATIONING
JUSTICE: THE UNDERFUNDING OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS, A 50-STATE SURVEY OF
TRIAL COURT ASSIGNED COUNSEL RATES 8 (2013).
288 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 712 P.2d 496, 501 (Haw. 1986) (explaining that
attorney must be permitted “broad latitude to make on-the-spot strategic choices” and
that “matters presumably within the judgment of counsel, like trial strategy, ‘will
rarely be second guessed by judicial hindsight’” (quoting State v. McNulty, 588 P.2d
438, 446 (Haw. 1978))); People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 587 (N.Y. 1998) (ruling
that counsel’s performance should be evaluated objectively “to determine whether it
was consistent with strategic decisions of a ‘reasonably competent attorney’”).
289 Thus, in applying this standard, strategic or tactical actions with an
obvious bent toward benefitting a defendant’s case will not be subject to challenge. As
the Supreme Court of Hawaii has explained, “[s]pecific actions or omissions alleged to
be error but which had an obvious tactical basis for benefitting the defendant’s case will
not be subject to further scrutiny. . . . If, however, the action or omission had no obvious
basis for benefitting defendant’s case,” further scrutiny of the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim will be appropriate. See Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966, 976 (Haw. 1993).
290 The Court in Wiggins took this position, finding that the attorneys’ failure
to investigate was not reasonable given the circumstances. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 534–35 (2003); Smith, 712 P.2d at 500 (explaining that a defense attorney’s
representation will not be “judged ineffective solely by hindsight”); Benevento, 697
N.E.2d at 587 (“[C]ounsel’s efforts should not be second-guessed with the clarity of
hindsight to determine how the defense might have been more effective.”).
291 See Smith, 712 P.2d at 500 (explaining that meaningful representation
standard does not require that a lawyer’s representation be errorless). “The
Constitution guarantees the accused a fair trial, not necessarily a perfect one.”
Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587.
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Consider Christina Gutierrez’s representation of Adnan
Syed.292 Gutierrez failed to contact and investigate potential
alibi witness Asia McClain. She also failed to cross-examine the
cell tower expert properly. Gutierrez’s performance in
conducting her investigation must be afforded, pursuant to
Strickland, a “heavy measure of deference.”293 Similarly,
whether and the manner in which she conducted crossexamination is considered a tactical or strategic decision, which
Strickland provides, is virtually unchallengeable.294 Luckily for
Syed, as explained previously, the court effectively relaxed
Strickland’s presumption of deference standard as courts most
commonly apply it.295 History indicates that most courts would
not have so concluded.
2. Replace Strickland Prejudice
The next change to the current ineffective assistance of
counsel calculus should be to replace Strickland’s prejudice
prong with an “impairment of meritorious defense” analysis.
Instead of the prejudice standard of Strickland, an ineffective
assistance of counsel petitioner will need to prove that his
lawyer’s unreasonable representation “resulted in either the
withdrawal of or substantial impairment of a potentially
meritorious defense.”296 A meritorious defense is one that would
have been likely to succeed or one that addressed the substance
or essence of the prosecution’s case. This impairment of
meritorious defense analysis would differ from the prejudice
prong of Strickland in several important respects. After first
determining whether counsel’s conduct was objectively
unreasonable without the benefit of presumptions, the petitioner
would need to establish that the lawyer’s unreasonable conduct
possibly impaired a potentially meritorious defense to which the
petitioner was entitled. Unlike the current Strickland prejudice
standard, the petitioner would not be required to prove a
standard analogous to a tort standard, i.e., that but for his
counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been

292 See discussion supra Part I (describing attorney Christina Gutierrez’s
representation of Adnan Syed).
293 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (“[A] particular
decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”).
294 See id. at 690–91.
295 See supra Section II.B.1.
296 See, e.g., Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966, 976 (Haw. 1993); see also Smith,
712 P.2d at 500.
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different.297 The meritorious defense analysis would not require
the petitioner to prove that his lawyer’s conduct actually
prejudiced his defense, nor would it be necessary for the
petitioner to establish that his lawyer’s conduct probably
prejudiced his defense.298 Rather, the relevant inquiry would be
whether the lawyer’s unreasonable conduct possibly impaired a
potentially meritorious defense to which the petitioner was
entitled. Admittedly, the science of predicting how any given
proceeding would have turned out if things had gone differently
is inexact at best. Thus, requiring a petitioner to prove that his
proceeding would have been different is to require him to prove
what is, in most cases, not provable. Alleviating a petitioner
from proving the unprovable redirects the focus of an
ineffectiveness claim to one where the aim is to uncover
constitutionally harmful defense lawyering rather than
providing relief to only those few prisoners who are able to
prove that which is very difficult to prove.299 This new
impairment of meritorious defense standard recognizes the
difficulty of predicting the precise effect that any event or lack
thereof might have had on the factfinder as the current
prejudice standard requires.300 By instead applying the
impairment of meritorious defense standard, what becomes
important is the recognition that counsel’s unreasonable
behavior interfered with a meritorious defense.301 Or, stated
differently, what becomes important is whether the criminal
defendant’s representation was meaningful. Representation by
one not acting as a lawyer is equivalent to a defendant having
297 In tort law, causation in fact is established by proof that defendant’s
negligent conduct probably resulted in the harm about which the plaintiff complains.
See, e.g., People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 588 (N.Y. 1998) (emphasizing that an
ineffectiveness claim is “ultimately concerned with the fairness of the process as a
whole rather than its particular impact on the outcome of the case” and concluding that
“whether defendant would have been acquitted of the charges but for counsel’s errors is
relevant, but not dispositive under the State constitutional guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel”).
298 See, e.g., Briones, 848 P.2d at 977.
299 For Vivian Berger’s argument that, rather than Strickland’s prejudice test,
the Court should embrace a harmless error standard that would properly place on the
state the burden of proving the result would not have been different, see Vivian O.
Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—a Dead
End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 96 (1986).
300 See, e.g., State v. Aplaca, 837 P.2d 1298, 1308 (Haw. 1992) (“Although we,
as an appellate court, cannot predict the exact effect these prospective witnesses would
have had on the trial court’s assessment of [the victim’s and the defendant’s]
credibility, we firmly believe that such testimony could have had a direct bearing on
the ultimate outcome of the case.”).
301 As such, it operates as an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice. As the
Hawaii Supreme Court has recognized, “Violation of an accused’s constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel warrants the irrebuttable presumption of prejudice.”
Briones, 848 P.2d at 978.
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no lawyer at all, in the same manner as Clarence Gideon had
no lawyer.
Consider Adnan Syed’s situation again if applying the
proposed impairment of meritorious defense standard.
Analyzing whether Christina Gutierrez’s unreasonable
representation resulted in either withdrawal of or substantial
impairment of a potentially meritorious defense would likely
lead a reviewing court to conclude that Syed received ineffective
assistance of counsel. The testimony of the alibi witness Asia
McClain, attesting to Syed’s presence at the library and not at
the murder scene, at a minimum addressed the essence of the
prosecution’s case against Syed, resulting in substantial
impairment of a meritorious defense. Likewise, competent
cross-examination also would have likely proven to result in a
successful defense, as the prosecution’s theory of the case
against Syed was in large part based on the unreliable cell
tower testimony proffered at his trial.
Eliminating the current Strickland presumptions of
competence and replacing Strickland’s prejudice prong with an
impairment of meritorious defense analysis will provide several
benefits. First, this more meaningful ineffective assistance of
counsel analysis will result in more capable lawyers protecting
the rights of criminal defendants.302 The difficulty that a
criminal defendant encounters in proving a Strickland claim
has adversely impacted the quality of the criminal defense bar
on the whole by contributing to the system’s inability to hold
criminal defense attorneys accountable for incompetent
representation.303 Second, improving the means by which the
system evaluates the constitutionality of criminal defense
lawyering will increase the public’s confidence in the criminal
justice system.304 The Court has repeatedly articulated that a
purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to
counsel is to create confidence in the criminal justice system.
However, the current level of criminal defense lawyering is so
low that too often there is a discernable gap between the legal
representation for criminal defendants and legal representation
302 Of course, there are other means of improving the quality of criminal
defense lawyering. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise,
101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1974 (1992) (advocating fee awards for defendants who prevail in
criminal cases as means of attracting more highly qualified counsel).
303 See generally Duncan, supra note 149 (explaining how system’s inability to
hold criminal defense attorneys accountable at any level—constitutional, civil, and
disciplinary levels—has resulted in unacceptably low quality criminal defense
lawyering).
304 See Klein, supra note 280 (proposing Strickland’s deference to attorneys
and preoccupation with ends rather than means undermines the adversary system).
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on behalf of the government. While a criminal trial is not a game
in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a
near match in skills, neither should our courts be respected
while they continue to validate trials in which essentially
unarmed prisoners are sacrificed to gladiators.305 Establishing
an ineffective assistance of counsel standard that provides a
more meaningful analysis of acceptable criminal defense
lawyering will have a positive impact in that criminal
defendants will be more ably defended and public confidence in
the criminal justice system will increase.306
There may also be a concern that adoption of the new
standard would prove to be too expensive because heightening
the standard by which to measure ineffective assistance of
counsel claims would result in more petitioners bringing
claims. It is true that a heightened chance of success may
increase the number of cases brought. Although increased costs
within the legal system may be a legitimate cause for concern,
what is more of a cause for concern is the cost of lost faith in
the criminal justice system. Further, there is a high cost to be
paid for the pervasive attitude that the rights of the criminally
accused are not worthy of true protection.307 Nonetheless, to
borrow from Powell v. Alabama, any concerns of increased
expense should be outweighed by ensuring the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants.308 The preservation of the
integrity of our justice system depends on such a concession.
305 Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 476–77 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting); see
also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 129 (1999) (explaining although criminal justice system will never
achieve perfect equality between rich and poor, “the current system does little more
than place a veneer of legitimacy on a system that is patently inadequate and unjust”).
306 This is not to suggest that all criminal defense lawyering is poor; it is not. Most
members of the criminal defense bar practice law honorably and competently. See Stephen
B. Bright, Turning Celebrated Principles into Reality, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 6
(recognizing those who have proudly and capably defended the criminally accused).
307 Cf. Nunn, supra note 197, at 803 (discussing disturbing fact that in many
jurisdictions, public defenders are paid much less than prosecutors and declaring that
such a disparity is “justified only if one thinks that defense work is somehow less
important”).
308 The Powell Court stated:

It is true that great and inexcusable delay in the enforcement of our criminal
law is one of the grave evils of our time. Continuances are frequently granted
for unnecessarily long periods of time, and delays incident to the disposition of
motions for new trials and hearings upon appeal have come in many cases to be
a distinct reproach to the administration of justice. The prompt disposition of
criminal cases is to be commended and encouraged. But in reaching that result
a defendant, charged with a serious crime, must not be stripped of his right to
have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense. To do that
is not to proceed promptly in the claimed spirit of regulated justice but to go
forward with the haste of the mob.
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At the Congressional Level, Remove AEDPA Barriers

Prisoners are understandably not the most sympathetic
players within the criminal justice system. As a result,
prisoners often have very little political muscle.309 When
AEDPA was enacted, there was widespread hostility toward
crime and criminals generally.310 Nonetheless, the enactment of
AEDPA is particularly unfair.
First, AEDPA’s requirement that the state law
conviction be the result of a decision contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “as
determined by the Supreme Court” is unduly restrictive.
Rather than requiring clearly established law as determined by
the Supreme Court, AEDPA should be amended to substitute
“established federal law” instead and eliminate the requirement
that the law be previously determined by the Supreme Court.
One of the problems with requiring it to have been determined
previously by the Supreme Court is that Court may never hear
some claims, as the Court is not required to grant certiorari on
direct appeals. For example, in considering Adnan Syed’s
situation, unless the United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari on direct appeal on a case with virtually identical
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a federal reviewing
court would likely not be permitted pursuant to AEDPA to
entertain his petition because there would not be clearly
established law as determined by the Supreme Court.
Second, AEDPA’s twin presumptions should be
eliminated. When a prisoner seeks to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, Strickland already requires proof of
deficient performance and prejudice, proof that must be
established in the face of Strickland’s “strong presumption” of
competent performance and presumption of no prejudice.
AEDPA’s twin presumptions further impose the “strong
presumption” that the state’s facts are correct as well as the
presumption that defense counsel’s conduct was competent.
Taken together, these presumptions make proving ineffective
assistance of counsel virtually unattainable. Coupled with
AEDPA’s requirement that any rebuttal of the presumption of
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932).
309 See generally O’Hear, supra note 201, at 224 (“[P]risoners seem poorly
positioned to resist becoming the target of symbolic legislation through which
politicians can express their disapproval of crime and criminals.”).
310 See generally id. (highlighting enactment of AEDPA and Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), restricting prisoners’ ability to recover monetary and injunctive
relief for constitutional violations within same month).
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the correctness of the state factual findings must be made by
clear and convincing evidence is bewildering when one
considers that the inquiry is determining whether a person’s
constitutional rights have been violated. It has moved to
apparent antipathy regarding whether constitutional rights are
valued or have been violated. For example, in Syed’s case, if the
state were to succeed in its current appeal, Syed would have a
very difficult time overcoming the barriers put in place by
AEDPA in an effort to have a federal court review the
constitutionality of his lawyer’s representation.311 With the
elimination of AEDPA, Syed would be in a better position to
have a federal court consider his constitutional claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.312 The application of AEDPA
goes beyond being unsympathetic to the plight of prisoners.
AEDPA’s twin presumptions, as well as the requirement that
the prisoner rebut the correctness of state’s factual findings by
clear and convincing evidence, should be eliminated.
Historically, habeas review of prisoners’ claims has been
important and vital to our criminal justice system.313 Inasmuch
as AEDPA severely restricts the ability of prisoners to receive
federal habeas review, at least one commentator has indicated
that Congress may have overstepped its authority in enacting
AEDPA.314 AEDPA should be amended, if not outright repealed.
This suggestion to abolish AEDPA may be viewed by some as
idealistic. However, proposals to amend the criminal justice
system, such as reducing mandatory minimums and easing
barriers to reentry, have recently received bipartisan support.315
311 Cf. Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Habeas Corpus for the Innocent, 19 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 15–16 (2016) (explaining that the rate of federal habeas review
post-AEDPA has dropped from 37% to 14%).
312 See id. at 14 (describing how, since the passage of AEDPA, “federal habeas
cases are increasingly decided on procedural grounds and more petitioners are
precluded from filing”); see also King, supra note 201, at 317 (describing the less than
1% grant of habeas relief post-AEDPA, a figure even lower than the success rate preAEDPA).
313 See, e.g., John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A
Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 471–79 (2011) (explaining
importance of federal habeas review as protection to prisoners whose constitutional
rights have been violated); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather
than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 89–91 (2012) (explaining importance of
federal habeas review as safeguard to constitutional criminal procedure).
314 See, e.g., Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L.
REV. 753 (2013) (explaining Congress may have overstepped its authority by enacting
AEDPA and essentially stripping federal court’s jurisdiction to review habeas claims).
But cf. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (favorably discussing Congressional
intent regarding recent amendments to AEDPA).
315 See, e.g., Russell Berman, Can the Senate Reform Criminal Justice?,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/will-criminaljustice-actually-be-reformed/408538/ [https://perma.cc/5BNF-X5TE]; Laura Barrón-López,
Senators Breathe New Life into Criminal Justice Reform Bill, Unveil Changes,
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This suggestion to remove the barriers of AEDPA is not too far
afield from these recent trends and is likewise a worthwhile
endeavor designed to improve the criminal justice system.
C.

At Judicial Level, Report Attorney Misconduct

Judicial codes of ethics require judges to report lawyer
misconduct.316 Yet empirical evidence indicates that judges who
witness attorney misconduct in their courtrooms often fail to
report the misconduct to disciplinary or other appropriate
authorities.317 Of course, failure to report attorney misconduct in
the criminal defense context can have devastating outcomes,
particularly when it comes to protection of a criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights.318 The disciplinary process is
underutilized as a means of improving competent legal
representation.319 Yet the disciplinary system is an ideal place to
impact the lawyering of specifically identified offenders
positively and quickly.320
Judges who witness poor criminal defense lawyering are
often in the best position to effect change in the quality of
lawyering in the courtroom.321 Jurists are in a position to
recognize poor and unacceptable lawyering and should not be
reluctant in reporting.322 Because there may be negative
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/senatorscriminal-justice-reform_us_57227d46e4b01a5ebde52012 [https://perma.cc/Q7E3-SWXE].
316 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2007) (providing that a “judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question
regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects shall inform the appropriate authority”).
317 See Michael S. McGinniss, Sending the Message: Using Technology to
Support Judicial Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to State Disciplinary Agencies, 2013
J. PROF. LAW. 37, 51 (2013) (explaining that it is common for courts not to report
lawyer misconduct to disciplinary agencies); Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial
Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported
Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1435 (2004) (explaining that judges do not report
attorney misconduct as often as they should).
318 See McGinniss, supra note 317, at 83 (explaining that attorney misconduct
must be reported by judges to disciplinary bodies to protect public).
319 See Duncan, supra note 149 (describing disciplinary system as safeguard
against poor criminal defense lawyering).
320 For instance, the impact could be removal by disbarment or suspension in
extreme cases or supervision and mentoring in appropriate cases.
321 See McGinniss, supra note 317, at 54 (positing judges have an “institutional
advantage as sources for . . . reporting [attorney] misconduct); see generally Arthur F.
Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct, 77 UMKC L. REV. 537 (2009)
(explaining how jurists are well-situated to report attorney misconduct).
322 In my opinion, reasons why jurists may not report witnessed misconduct
may vary widely and include political considerations, cronyism, reputational concerns,
and the reality that criminal law practice often occurs within a small universe of
lawyers, all of whom have face-to-face encounters with each other frequently.
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consequences associated with reporting lawyer misconduct—
especially for an elected official—judges may not carry out the
mandates of their ethical codes.323 Nonetheless, judicial
reporting of poor criminal defense lawyering is essential to
improve the quality of criminal defense lawyering.324 Improving
the quality of criminal defense lawyering is the best way to
protect the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants.
D.

At Prosecutorial Level, Jurisdictions Should Enact
Open-File Legislation

At the prosecutorial level, jurisdictions should (1) enact
open-file legislation, if they have not already done so, and (2)
provide constant ethics training for all members of their
prosecutorial staff. The enactment of open-file legislation as
well as ongoing prosecutorial ethical training will result in
further protection of the rights of criminal defendants.
First, nationwide implementation of open-file legislation
will lead to more competent criminal defense lawyering.325
Open-file statutes permit the defense in criminal cases to
access all nonprivileged information that the prosecution and
other policing agencies have in their files, or over which they
have control, pertaining to a defendant’s case. Approximately
one-third of the states—including Arizona, California, Florida,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas—have implemented relatively
broad discovery rules, some modeled after the American Bar
Association’s ethical standards for prosecutors.326 Texas’s
323 Cf. Greenbaum, supra note 321, at 559 (explaining why judges do not
currently take their reporting functions of attorney misconduct seriously enough).
324 See generally Greenbaum, supra note 321, at 559 (suggesting various means
by which to encourage judicial reporting of serious lawyer misconduct); McGinniss, supra
note 317 (proposing database reporting system of lawyer misconduct).
325 See Mike Klinkosum, Pursuing Discovery in Criminal Cases: Forcing Open
the Prosecution’s Files, THE CHAMPION, May 2013, at 26, https://www.nacdl.org/
Champion.aspx?id=28476 [https://perma.cc/V5V9-XZSV] (explaining that full and total
access to prosecutorial files will lead to more effective and zealous advocacy of criminal
defendants).
326 See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1) (“[T]he prosecutor shall . . . disclose to
the defendant . . . a list of the names and addresses of all persons known to the
prosecutor to have information that may be relevant . . . [and] the statement of any
[such] person . . . [plus other information such as that which] has been provided by a
confidential
informant . . . whether
there
has
been
any
electronic
surveillance . . . reports or statements of experts . . . and any tangible papers or objects
that the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial and that were not
obtained from or that did not belong to the defendant.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A903(a)(1) (West 2012) (“Upon motion of the defendant, the court must order: The State
to make available to the defendant the complete files of all law enforcement agencies,
investigatory agencies, and prosecutors’ offices involved in the investigation of the
crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant.”); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1 (“[T]he
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legislation clearly requires prosecutors to share certain case
material with the defense, including police reports and witness
statements.327 The authors of Texas’s legislation emphasized
that the purpose of the act was to prevent wrongful convictions
with the hope being that such open-file discovery would ensure
that each criminal defendant would be guaranteed the
constitutional right to an appropriate defense.328

prosecutor shall make available to the defendant [names and addresses of witnesses,
all statements of the defendant, all law enforcement reports, information about
experts, any tangible items prosecutor intends to use at trial, informant information]
within the prosecutor’s possession or control.”); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14 ([T]he prosecution
shall disclose to the defense, and permit the defense to discover, inspect and copy
[statements by the defendant, grand jury minutes, any exculpatory facts, witness
information, law enforcement reports] at or prior to the pretrial conference, provided it
is relevant to the case and is in the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor,
persons under the prosecutor’s direction and control, or persons who have participated
in investigating or evaluating the case and either regularly report to the prosecutor’s
office or have done so in the case.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 2017) (“The
prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney all of the
following materials and information, if it is in the possession of the prosecuting
attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the
investigating agencies: [t]he names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to
call as witnesses at trial; [s]tatements of all defendants; [a]ll relevant real evidence
seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the offenses charged; [t]he existence
of a felony conviction of any material witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to
the outcome of the trial; [a]ny exculpatory evidence; [r]elevant written or recorded
statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor
intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in
conjunction with the case, including the results of physical or mental examinations,
scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in
evidence at the trial.”); N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:13-3 (“[T]he prosecutor shall, at the time of
the plea offer is made, provide defense counsel with all available relevant material that
would be discoverable at the time of indictment.”); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412 (providing for
broad discovery upon defense motion); MICH. R. MCR 6.201 (providing for broad
discovery upon request of defendant); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16 (providing for broad
discovery “[u]pon receipt of a written demand for discovery by the defendant”); PA. R.
CRIM. P. 573 (providing for relatively broad discovery “on request by the defendant”);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2015) (“[A]s soon as practicable after
receiving a timely request from the defendant the state shall produce and permit the
inspection and the electronic duplication, copying, and photographing, by or on behalf
of the defendant, of any offense reports, any designated documents, papers, written or
recorded statements of the defendant or a witness, including witness statements of law
enforcement officers but not including the work product of counsel for the state in the
case and their investigators and their notes or report, or any designated books,
accounts, letters, photographs, or objects or other tangible things not otherwise
privileged that constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and that are in the possession, custody, or control of the state or any person
under contract with the state.”); see also Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery:
Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 541, 577 (2006)
(indicating Arizona, Massachusetts, and North Carolina have moved toward
broadening criminal discovery); Klinkosum, supra note 325, at 27.
327 Cf. Prosser, supra note 326, at 598–99 (arguing that “[p]olice reports
should be made available to defense counsel at the defendant’s first court appearance”
and “[s]upplemental police reports should be provided . . . as they are created”).
328 S.B. 1611, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013) (Sponsor’s Statement of Intent)
(“Every defendant should have access to all the evidence relevant to his guilt or

1708

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:4

Some district attorney’s offices nationwide have policies
of being more forthcoming in criminal discovery, even though
such policies are not enacted legislatively.329 However, it is
important that states adopt legislation rather than merely
having in place a policy of allowing defense counsel access to
files. Legislation mandating open files will lead to consistency
and eliminate the need for the use of prosecutorial discretion in
determining defense attorneys’ access to nonprivileged
information about their cases.330 For instance, Brady v.
Maryland and its progeny mandate that prosecutorial
authorities disclose to the defense all material, exculpatory
information. However, the initial determination regarding
whether information constitutes Brady material is left to the
discretion of prosecutors. Requiring prosecutors to don a defense
lawyer’s hat to determine whether information might be helpful
to the defense is an exploration at which some prosecutors are ill
equipped. Perhaps, as a result, Brady violations still constitute a
pervasive problem within the criminal justice system.331 Enacting
open-file legislation will remove the need for prosecutorial
innocence, with adequate time to examine it. A defendant who understands the extent
of the evidence against him can make an informed decision to plead.”).
329 See, e.g., 3A TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR ARKANSAS LAWYERS § 79:8 (2013–2014 ed.)
(“Many prosecutor’s offices in Arkansas maintain an open file policy in lieu of
complying with formal discovery under ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1 to 17.5 . . . . Defense
counsel should move for discovery even when there is an open file policy in case some
material was not delivered by the police to the prosecutor.”). Unfortunately, a recent
federal proposal to require open file discovery failed. See Fairness in Disclosure of
Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012). On the federal side, in 2012 the
U.S. Senate proposed a bill to give federal criminal discovery laws a facelift by
expanding federal prosecutors’ duties to disclose favorable evidence and by eliminating
the requirement that only material or exculpatory information be disclosed. The act
would have required federal prosecutors to disclose information “that may reasonably
appear to be favorable to the defendant . . . with respect to: (A) the determination of
guilt; (B) any preliminary matter before the court before which the criminal
prosecution is pending; or (C) the sentence to be imposed.” Id.; see Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding prosecutors must disclose evidence to defense only
when it is “material either to guilt or to punishment”). In effect, the proposed
legislation would have brought prosecutors’ statutory obligations in line with their
ethical obligations as provided by the American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2011) (requiring prosecutors “make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to
the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except
when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the
tribunal”). Though the proposed legislation died in committee, the requirement was
designed to apply both to information already in the prosecution’s “possession, custody,
or control” and to information known to the prosecutors or that would be discovered “by
the exercise of due diligence.” S. 2197 § 2.
330 Open-file legislation, as contrasted with an open-file policy, is imperative
so that the procedures or policies in place do not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
331 See Klinkosum, supra note 325.
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discretion. Instead, the relevant inquiry will merely be whether
the information is privileged or not.
Another benefit of adopting open-file systems will be the
preservation of criminal defendants’ resources. Defense counsel
will no longer presumably have to make multiple requests for
information from the prosecuting authorities, allowing their
resources to be directed elsewhere. In a system where prosecuting
authorities most often outweigh that of the defense, enacting a
system which will, in the long run, preserve scarce defense
resources is critical. After all, the criminal justice system
should not be a test of who has the most resources and who has
the best lawyers.332 A transparent prosecutorial office will aid
criminal defense attorneys in the preservation of their resources,
thereby allowing them to provide adequate representation to
their clients. Again, as mentioned earlier, many criminal defense
attorneys are overworked and undercompensated. Every effort
to preserve scarce defense resources will benefit their clients.
Open-file systems will further ensure that justice is done
and that prosecutors are ministers of justice, not mere advocates
for the government.333 Unfortunately, too often prosecutors
concern themselves with seeking convictions rather than
pursuing justice.334 A prosecutor’s primary responsibility is not
necessarily to convict, but rather to see that justice is carried
out, and part of that responsibility requires prosecutors to ensure
that defendants are afforded the due protections of the law.335
In addition to open-file systems, prosecutors will benefit
from constant instruction on their unique role within the criminal
justice system and the ethical obligations associated with their
role. Unlike other attorneys, in representing their clients,
prosecutors are to serve the overarching goal of seeing that

332 See supra Part I (discussing resources attorney Christina Gutierrez
expended arguing with prosecution in Adnan Syed’s case).
333 See, e.g., MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N
1983); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 3-1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (“The prosecutor is an
administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court.”).
334 Cf. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 3-1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (“The duty of the
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”).
335 Id. at standard 3-3.11, commentary (“This responsibility carries with it
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt
is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to
prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”). Certainly, prosecutorial
incentives to convict, such as increases in pay and promotions based on their conviction
rates, should be eliminated.
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justice is done.336 Their job—before reaching the courtroom and
while in the courtroom—is to ensure the fairness of the judicial
process. Unlike other trial attorneys, prosecutors cannot be
single-mindedly devoted to “the win.” Rather, their advocacy on
behalf of the government carries with it the mandate that they
ensure that the defendant’s rights are protected. When
prosecutors forget that their job is not to be merely adversarial,
they run the risk of trampling (intentionally or unintentionally)
on a defendant’s rights. A way to prevent prosecutors from
forgetting to pursue that justice is to require continuous ethical
training—at least annually, if not more often—as a reminder of
their special responsibilities as prosecutors.
In considering Adnan Syed’s case, if the prosecuting
authorities had had more of an eye on their special ethical
obligation to ensure fairness of the judicial process and their
responsibilities to protect a criminal defendant’s rights, they
presumably would have been more forthcoming with Gutierrez’s
requests for information, such as the primary witness Jay
Wild’s statements and the victim’s autopsy report. Gutierrez
was placed in a position of having to use her finite resources
and time demanding that the prosecutors comply with
reasonable requests for information. As a result, not only were
precious defense resources expended but precious judicial
resources were also unnecessarily expended. Presumably, Syed’s
attorney Christina Gutierrez would have been able to redirect
her resources to prepare Syed’s defense adequately.
E.

At Defense Bar Level, Fund Public Defender Offices on
Par with Prosecution

It is well known that public defender offices nationwide
are understaffed and underfunded.337 Public defenders need
more resources to do their jobs properly.338 It is important to
the protection of criminal defendants that public defender
offices receive funding that puts them at parity with
prosecutorial resources. After firing Gutierrez for her poor
336 See, e.g., MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2014) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that
of an advocate.”).
337 See, e.g., Alex Stuckey, In Missouri, Public Defenders Describe Mountains
of Work, Low Pay, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/in-missouri-public-defenders-describe-mountains-of-worklow-pay/article_c46b8f10-4f97-5a19-932e-c4c229a3b722.html [https://perma.cc/JF3N-3DBJ]
(describing funding for Missouri public defenders as “at its lowest level in four years”).
338 See Mickenberg, supra note 5, at 327 (explaining system needs to ensure
criminal defense attorneys have “skills, money, and resources to do the[ir] job properly”).
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representation at his trial, Syed was represented by a public
defender at his sentencing.339 One of the complaints that Syed
had about Gutierrez was that she refused to notify the court of
new information regarding three alibi witnesses, including
Asia McClain, who averred that she was with Syed at the time
the state alleged that Lee was murdered.340 After the firing of
Gutierrez, the public defender assigned to represent Syed met
with him only briefly and did not bring this new alibi witness
information to the attention of the court.341 Likely not having
the time to delve more deeply into the particulars of Syed’s
situation, the public defender merely advised Syed to express
remorse for his crime and plead for the mercy of the court342
rather than, for example, arguing in a motion for a new trial
that a new trial should be granted based on newly discovered
evidence that a primary alibi witness, Asia McClain, was never
contacted by Syed’s previous trial counsel.343
Syed’s experience with his public defender is not
unusual in Maryland344—or in many other jurisdictions. A
properly funded public defender office presumably could have
made a real difference in his case, as the public defender would
have provided Syed with at least the attention his case
deserved at that stage of the proceedings—an attorney who
would have had time to review the case and properly determine
that the new alibi witness evidence should have at least been
presented to the court prior to imposing a sentence.
Increased funding of public defender offices would
presumably lead to increased staffing. Increased staffing would
lead to more reasonable caseloads for each attorney working in
the public defender system. More reasonable caseloads would,
at a minimum, hopefully lead to an increase in the amount of
time an attorney would be able to spend on each client’s case.

See CHAUDRY, supra note 15, at 179–80.
See id. at 177–179.
341 See id. at 180–83.
342 See id.
343 See MD. R. CRIM. PROC. 4-331 (allowing for a motion for new trial in criminal
matter to be filed in Maryland within ten days of verdict); see, e.g., State v. Devers, 272
A.2d 794, 802 (Md. 1971) (explaining that a principal ground for granting a motion for
new trial includes newly discovered evidence); Yorke v. State, 556 A.2d 230, 234–35
(1989) (explaining that standard for determining whether defendant was entitled to new
trial on basis of newly discovered evidence is whether the evidence may well have
produced a different result).
344 See, e.g., Coburn, supra note 286.
339

340
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CONCLUSION
What currently passes for adequate criminal defense
representation is unacceptable. Strickland’s influence has
certainly contributed to this sad reality.345 However,
Strickland’s influence is not solely responsible for the poor
quality of criminal defense attorneys.346 Problems exist at
virtually every level of the criminal justice system that must be
corrected and, when corrected, will improve criminal defense
lawyering overall.347 Until recently, Adnan Syed was just
another casualty of the criminal justice system’s toleration of
poor defense lawyering. Without the vast publicity his case
received, there was little chance that Syed could have secured
the post-conviction relief he was recently granted. Even though
he has had to wait almost twenty years for relief—and as of
this writing remains in prison awaiting a new trial—social
media and public attention have made Syed a lucky man
indeed. However, luck should not be required.
It is important to remember that the American criminal
justice system is premised on the notion that it is better for ten
guilty people to go free than for one innocent person to be
imprisoned.348 Unfortunately, the Court’s constant reference to
Sixth Amendment protections as being closely intertwined with
the preservation of the criminal process as a fair and just
system is difficult to reconcile with its position that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees do not serve the purpose of improving
the quality of criminal defense lawyering.349 For purposes of the
Sixth Amendment, the necessity of a criminal defense lawyer350
and the goal of a fair trial351 are too interrelated to exclude from
consideration the quality of that criminal defense attorney.352
345 See discussion supra Part II (explaining how the Court’s decision in
Strickland v. Washington adversely affected quality criminal defense lawyering).
346 See discussion supra Part III (describing how AEDPA negatively impacted
prisoners’ abilities to acquire post-conviction relief successfully).
347 See discussion supra Part V (suggesting changes at various levels of justice
system which will improve criminal defense lawyering overall).
348 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358 (“[F]or the law holds
that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”).
349 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (stating that “the
purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve
the quality of legal representation”).
350 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[L]awyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries”).
351 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
352 See Nunn, supra note 197, at 744–56 (“We like to consider the criminal
trial, with its adversarial process, as one of the great institutions of abstract justice.
But the American criminal justice system is a sham. . . . [T]he criminal trial is flawed
because it is not adversarial (or at least not as adversarial as it should be).”).
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In the words of the Court: “The very premise of our adversary
system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the
guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.”353 And as stated
recently by Justice Sotomayor, “whatever flaws do exist in our
system can be tolerated only by remaining faithful to our
Constitution’s procedural safeguards.”354
If, as the Court has stated, one of the purposes of the
presence of a criminal defense attorney is to maintain a
balance between governmental prosecuting authorities and the
criminally accused, then the quality of the defense attorney
must play an important role in the equation.355 Insisting upon,
encouraging, and enabling quality criminal defense lawyering
will not only help restore the public’s faith in the criminal
justice system, but more importantly, it will better protect
criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to truly effective
assistance of counsel.356

353 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (internal citations omitted)
(footnotes omitted).
354 Elmore v. Holbrook, 137 S. Ct. 3, 9 (2016) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
355 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed
essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly society. . . . That government
hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend
are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries.”); Nunn, supra note 197, at 751 (“The purpose of the
defendant’s trial rights is to place the defendant on an even footing with the
prosecution so that he or she might be a more effective adversary to the prosecution.”).
356 A statement that Justice Harlan made in his concurring opinion in Gideon
is equally applicable here: “To continue a rule which is honored by this Court only with
lip service is not a healthy thing and in the long run will do disservice to the federal
system.” Gideon, 372 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).

